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Federal Removal Jurisdiction
IRA S. FLORY, JR.*
The purpose of this article is to outline the conditions under
which a suit originally commenced in a state court may be re-
moved to a federal tribunal. It is no exaggeration to say that this
is the most complicated and needlessly detailed aspect of federal
procedure. At the same time, its importance to a practitioner
faced with the necessity of deciding when and under what circum-
stances to remove a suit to the federal courts is undeniable. There-
fore, the inquiry is well worth undertaking, even though the price
to be paid by both author and reader alike is an excursion into a
limitless jungle of constitutional provisions, statutory enactments,
and a vast body of case law. The present article is in no sense in-
tended as a definitive work. Yet, it is hoped that the abundant
references to supporting authorities, both doctrinal and decisional,
will clear the way to an adequate understanding of the difficult
subject of removal jurisdiction.
At the outset, it is very important to note that the effect of the
new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure upon removal is not within
the scope of this study. It is true that the Federal Rules apply to
actions removed to the federal courts and "govern all procedure
after removal."1 However, this work is restricted to a considera-
tion of jurisdiction to remove. Consequently, the new rules, which
operate upon removal proceedings only after removal is actually
effected, will not be dealt with here.
STATUTES
The original jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is purely
statutory in nature.2 The only court to draw part of its powers
directly from the Constitution itself is the Supreme Court, which
Member of the Shreveport Bar.
1. Rule 81 (c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following
§ 723 (c) (Supp. 1938). Borton v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 25 F. Supp. 579
(D.C. Nev. 1938); Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Stueve, 25 F. Supp. 879 (D.C. Minn.
1938). See Flory and McMahon, The New Federal Rules and Louisiana Prac-
tice (1938) 1 LouIsiANA LAW REvIEw 45.
2. Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. 7, 1 L. Ed. 718 (1799); U.S. v.
Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812); M'Intire v. Wood, 11 U.S.
504, 3 L.Ed. 420 (1813); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 12 L.Ed. 1147 (1850).
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was given original jurisdiction of "all cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a State
shall be a party.'" Hence, it can be said that for all practical pur-
poses federal removal jurisdiction is entirely a matter of statutory
law.
Removal jurisdiction was provided for in section 12 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789,' but it was not until after the Civil War that
removal attained the considerable importance it has today. The
bitterness aroused by that conflict caused Congress to allow more
frequent resort to the federal courts by widening greatly the scope
of cases removable. In 1866 there was passed what is often called
the Separable Controversy Act.3 The act specially provided that
the removal by the nonresident of his separable controversy did
not prejudice the right of the plaintiff to continue in the state
court against the other defendants.6
The Prejudice or Local Influence Act of 1867,J amending the
1866 act, likewise did much to increase the number of cases re-
movable. This act permitted removal under circumstances where
diversity of citizenship existed and where a party, whether plain-
tiff or defendant, filed an affidavit that he had reason to and did
believe that he could not obtain justice in the state court.
Section 639 of the United States Revised Statutes, taking
effect June 22, 1874, codified the prior removal statutes, including
the essentials of each. The next step was the Judiciary Act of
1875,8 which marks the high point of removal jurisdiction. Sec-
tion 2 declared removable by either party any suit pending in
a state court, (1) involving the jurisdictional sum of five hundred
dollars, and (2) arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States, or in which (3) there is a controversy between
citizens of different states, or (4) in which the United States is
plaintiff, or (5) a controversy between citizens of the same state
claiming under land grants of different states, or (6) between
citizens of a state and a foreign state, citizen, or subject. Also, (7)
when in such a suit a separable controversy exists between citi-
3. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
4. 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
5. 14 Stat. 306 (1866).
6. This Is not the existing rule, for, as will be seen under the present
statute, the removal of the separable controversy to the federal court takes
with It the entire case, on the theory that a single court ought to pass on
every phase of the case. City of Gainesville v. Brown-Crummer Inv. Co., 277
U.S. 54, 48 S.Ct. 454, 72 L.Ed. 781 (1928).
7. 14 Stat. 558 (1867).
8. 18 Stat. 470 (1875).
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zens of different states which could be fully settled as between
them, either one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants actually
interested in the controversy may remove into the circuit court
(district court since Judicial Code of 1912) of the United States
for the proper district. The procedure of removal is outlined in
section 3, which provides (8) that the petition of removal be filed
in the state court before or at the term at which the cause could
be first tried and before the trial, and (9) that the bond with
surety be likewise filed for entering in the circuit court a copy of
the record and for the payment of costs of removal, should the
case be declared improperly removed, and be remanded.
So great was the number of cases removed under the acts of
the sixties and seventies, that certain limitations were deemed
advisable in the Judiciary Act of 1887-88.1 Only the defendant-
and only a nonresident one in many cases-was thereafter per-
mitted to remove; the jurisdictional amount went up to two thous-
and dollars; an order remanding a case to a state court could not
be reviewed on appeal; application for removal had to be made
before the defendant was by state law required to file his first
pleadings; and in removals for prejudice or local influence, appli-
cation could no longer be made at any time before the "final" trial
as under the 1867 Act, but must be made "before the trial thereof."
These changes were carried over into the Judicial Code of
1912 (§ 28) 10 which also raised the federal jurisdictional amount to
a sum exceeding three thousand dollars. Sentence 1 declares that
any suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, may be re-
moved by the defendant or defendants to the proper district court
of the United States if the case was one of which the district court
had original jurisdiction. The second "carry-all" sentence pro-
vides that any other suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, of
which the Uhited States district courts have jurisdiction, may be
removed from a state court into the proper federal district court
by the defendant or defendants, who must be nonresidents of that
state. In the third sentence there is provision for separable con-
troversies. Sentence 4 permits a defendant, who is a citizen of a
state other than that in which suit is brought, to apply for removal
at any time before trial by showing to the federal district judge
that because of prejudice and local influence he will not be able
9. 24 Stat. 552 (1887); 25 Stat. 433 (1888).
10. 28 U.S.C.A. § 71 (1926).
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to obtain justice in any state court in which he could have the case
tried. The proviso is added that if it appears to the district judge
that the state court can continue with the case as to the other de-
fendants without prejudicing anyone's rights, the federal judge
may remand that part of the suit for further proceedings in the
state court; while the district court can at any time before trial-
the affidavit of the removing party being opposed by the other
party-inquire into whether such prejudice exists, and remand
the case if satisfied that it does not. When a cause has been im-
properly removed, the district court may order its remand, from
which decision there is no appeal. The last sentence forbids re-
moval of suits brought in state courts of competent jurisdiction
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
Constitutionality
The statutes of removal have had many attacks made upon
them, but the grant of constitutional authority to Congress to pass
acts in regard to federal jurisdiction is so wide that the federal
courts have uniformly upheld such legislation,1 even though some
of the provisions objected to have since been changed by Congress
itself. In the state courts there were early cases 12 which denied
the validity of the removal statutes, but ever since the United
States Supreme Court settled the question by upholding their con-
stitutionality the state courts have submitted to that controlling
decision.1
One more limited assault was made on that part of the 1867
Act which provided that a citizen of one state, who has started
suit in a court of another state against one of its citizens, might
remove to a federal court. A state court had held this invalid on
the ground that by choosing the state court as his battleground a
plaintiff waives the right to litigate in a federal court, which can-
not divest the state court of its already-attached authority at the
instance of the plaintiff.14 There was a reversal by the United
States Supreme Court, however, on the ground that the statute
11. Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. 247, 18 L.Ed. 851 (1867).
12. Johnson v. Gordon, 4 Cal. 368 (1854), overruled by Greely v. Townsend,
25 Cal. 605, 613 (1864); Moseley v. Chamberlain, 18 Wis. 700 (1861).
13. Goodman v. City of Oshkosh, 45 Wis. 355 (1878); People ex rel. Mabley
v. Judge of Superior Court, 41 Mich. 31, 1 N.W. 985 (1879). On the other hand,
even a proper case of removal does not require the state court to dismiss the
case entirely, but only to permit its jurisdiction to pass to the federal court of
that district when certain statutory requirements are met. Webre v. Duroc,
15 La. Ann. 65 (1860).
14. Whitton v. Chicago and N. W. Ry. Co., 25 Wis. 424, 3 Am. Rep. 101
(1870).
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was within the constitutional power of Congress to direct the fed-
eral courts to try cases on diversity of citizenship and federal
questions, with nothing being said of waiver by the plaintiff of his
right to litigate in federal courts by entering suit in the state
court.1 5
Another point of disagreement between state and federal
courts was the provision under the Prejudice or Local Influence
Act of 1867 that removal might be made by either party to a con-
troversy between citizens of different states on a proper showing
of local prejudice, by application at any time "before final hearing
or trial of the suit." A New York case declared the provision void
as divesting a state court of concurrent jurisdiction after it has
once attached, even though a conclusive trial has not yet been
had.16 The contrary view was taken by the United States Supreme
Court in Home Life Ins. Co. v. Dunn," where the plaintiff had
secured a judgment acting as a lien on defendant's property, but
the defendant secured the award of a new trial. The defendant
then asked for removal, which was granted, on the theory that
application is made before "final trial" so long as any further trial
yet remained in the lower court. The judgment is final until that
new trial is obtained, however, and until the application for it has
been passed on, final trial is deemed to have been held, necessitat-
ing the denial of removal.18 Furthermore, after an appeal has been
taken to the state supreme court, a final trial has been held below,
and the case is no longer removable under this clause' As to what
constitutes a "final trial," it has been held that a report of com-
missioners on a claim submitted by the state probate court is not
such a trial as to prevent removal to the federal circuit court of
that district. 0
The Act of 1887-88, as has been mentioned, set the time of re-
moval for cases of prejudice or local influence at "any time be-
fore the trial thereof," and this has been interpreted as meaning
before the first trial, so that application is too late after three trials
15. Railway Co. v. Whitton, 80 U.S. 270, 20 L.Ed. 571 (1871). Accord:
Meadow Valley Min. Co. v. Dodds, 7 Nev. 143, 8 Am. Rep. 709 (1871); Burson
v. National Park Bank, 40 Ind. 173, 13 Am. Rep. 285 (1872).
16. Stephens v. Howe, 43 How. Prac. 134 (N.Y. 1872). Accord, Galpin v.
Critchlow, 112 Mass. 339, 17 Am. Rep. 176 (1875).
17. 86 U.S. 214, 22 L.Ed. 68 (1874).
18. Vannevar v. Bryant, 88 U.S. 41, 22 L.Ed. 476 (1874).
19. Stevenson v. Williams, 86 U.S. 572, 22 L.Ed. 162 (1873).
20. Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U.S. 73, 5 S.Ct. 377, 28 L.Ed. 927 (1885). Though
the case arose after the Judiciary Act of 1875 was passed, that statute did not
mention removal for prejudice or local influence, and so did not impliedly
repeal the provision in the Act of 1867 which was still in effect.
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have been held and new ones awarded.21 The present policy of
limiting the power of removal to cases clearly within statutory
bounds is shown in the refusal to allow removal for prejudice or
local influence existing as between the defendants. 2 Moreover,
though the Judicial Code (section 28, sentence 4) does not specific-
ally require all the conditions of original jurisdiction for the
removal of such cases, these conditions are considered as implied
because prejudice or local influence is merely a special ground of
removal. 23
In Tennessee v. Davis,2 4 the question arose as to whether a
criminal case was included in the words of the Constitution: "all
cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution, the laws
of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made
under their authority. 25 The Judiciary Act of 1789 had provided
only for removal of civil cases, but the act of 1833 added that a
prosecution against a federal revenue officer for an act committed
while carrying out his duties could be removed. As a necessary
precaution to protect federal authority, the majority of the Court
interpreted this to mean crimes punishable by the state alone.2 1
Since the act of 1833 included the charge of murder, it was then
necessary to see whether it was constitutional and permitted un-
der the above words. The Court held that both civil and criminal
cases were included and that each type of case could constitution-
ally be removed if statutory authorization existed.
Another constitutional question was whether quo warranto
proceedings by a state against a corporation created under its own
laws could be removed. 27 The Constitution gives to the Supreme
Court original jurisdiction in cases in which a state is a party, and
also in cases involving ambassadors and ministers of other coun-
tries,28 but the Court declared those provisions to have been for the
protection of the states and the diplomatic officers, to prevent the
consequences of suit against them in a court of lesser dignity.
When the state or minister is the plaintiff, the reason for exclusive
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court does not apply, and when a
21. Fisk v. Henarle, 142 U.S. 459, 12 S.Ct. 207, 36 L.Ed. 1080 (1892).
22. Hanrlck v. Hanrick, 153 U.S. 192, 14 S.Ct. 835, 38 L.Ed. 685 (1894).
23. In re Pennsylvania Co., 137 U.S. 451, 11 S.Ct. 141, 34 L.Ed. 738 (1890)
(jurisdictional amount of $2,000 was needed).
24. 100 U.S. 257, 25 L.Ed. 648 (1880).
25. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2.
26. The dissent presented the idea that the only crimes triable in federal
courts are those made such by act of Congress.
27. Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 4 S.Ct. 437, 28 L.Ed. 482 (1884).
28. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1.
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federal question is raised by the state's inquiry in its own courts
as to a corporation's authority to do business there, removal is
allowed to the federal circuit court.29
In performing its duty of determining whether a case is prop-
erly removed, the federal district court must, under the present
trend, 0 decide whether the strict requirements of the applicable
statute are met; and if not, the usual procedure is to remand to
the state court-an action which cannot be reviewed on appeal. "a
If there are two plaintiffs who are citizens of different states, and
the defendant is a citizen of still a third, suit in the district where
one plaintiff resides does not satisfy the requirement that suit be
in the home district of either plaintiff or defendant."1 This venue
provision applies to corporations as well as to natural persons, to
protect them from suit at any place other than the home district
of plaintiff or defendant.3 2 An action against a receiver of a state
corporation is not such a suit under the federal constitution or
laws as to allow the receiver to remove because of his appoint-
ment by a federal court, though he might also have been sued in
the court selecting him. 3
This, then, is the importance of the removal statutes: the en-
tire right to take a case from a competent state court to the federal
tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction rests on bringing the case with-
in the terms of an act of Congress which does not exceed the lim-
its set forth in the Constitution. The state court judges only the
question of law, that is, whether the petition and bond of removal
conform to these statutes, and if it decides this question affirma-
tively, the state court is immediately divested of control over the
case, leaving to the federal courts any issues of fact that might
arise.8 4 The statutory requirements must be strictly met before
29. The quo warranto proceeding, while somewhat penal in nature, was
declared sufficiently a civil suit to come under the removal acts; and the de-
fendant, though a resident, was allowed to remove since the removal on the
ground of a federal question does not even now require nonresidence of the
removing party. Judicial Code, § 28, sentence 1, 28 U.S.C.A. § 71 (1926); and so
held in General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore and M.S. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 261, 43 S.Ct.
106, 67 L.Ed. 244 (1922).
30. Clinger's Adm'x v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 138 Ky. 615, 128 S.W.
1065 (1910).
30a. Pabst v. Roxana Petroleum Co., 30 F. (2d) 953 (D.C.S.D. Tex. 1929).
31. Smith v. Lyon, 133 U.S. 315, 10 S.Ct. 303, 33 L.Ed. 635 (1890).
32. Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444, 12 S.Ct. 935, 36 L.Ed. 768
(1892).
33. Gableman v. Peoria, Decatur, and Evansville R. Co., 179 U.S. 335, 21
S.Ct. 171, 45 L.Ed. 220 (1900).
34. Kern v. Huidekoper, 103 U.S. 485, 26 L.Ed. 354 (1880); Manning v.
Amy, 140 U.S. 137, 11 S.Ct. 707, 35 L.Ed. 386 (1891); Madisonville Traction Co.
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the state court loses control of the case. Legislative policy has
frequently prompted changes in the statutes themselves, and the
courts have followed their lead, mostly toward the restriction of
federal jurisdiction on removal8 5 So well have the courts done
their work in this no-man's-land of jurisdiction that from the
badly-drawn statute passed in 1887-88 and from such pre-existing
principles as were still applicable, there has emerged a certain
degree of order. What that order consists in will be considered at
some length in the remaining sections of this article.
WAIVER AND STATE STATUTES
Non-interference by States
Since federal jurisdiction is governed by federal statute, the
states cannot interfere with the privilege of its exercise." The
right of removal likewise exists independently of state action,
which cannot be used directly or indirectly to limit or defeat it. 7
At times, the states use ingenious devices to prevent removal, but
usually they fail. For example, the provision in a state wrongful
death statute, that such a suit could be brought only in its courts,
was declared void, and removal could be secured on a showing of
federal jurisdiction.,,
A federal court will decide for itself whether it has jurisdic-
tion over the subject-matter of a case; 89 and it makes this decision
as to probate matters, unaffected by limitations of state statute 0
or order of the state court.41 A state statute cannot call unneces-
sary parties indispensable so as to forestall removal,' 2 nor can it
prevent a party from removing by calling him a plaintiff when he
v. St. Bernard Min. Co., 196 U.S. 239, 25 S.Ct. 251, 49 L.Ed. 462 (1905). However,
on occasion there has been an appeal to the state supreme court from an
order of removal, instead of a motion to remand. Fournet v. De Vilbiss, 187
La. 191, 174 So. 259 (1937), and cases therein cited (under par. [1]).
35. Golden v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 58 P. (2d) 1042 (1936).
36. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan Co., 154 U.S. 362, 14 S.Ct. 1047, 38 L.Ed. 1014
(1894); Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Min. Co., 196 U.S. 239, 26 S.Ct.
251, 49 L.Ed. 462 (1905); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed.
714, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 932, 14 Ann. Cas. 764 (1908).
37. Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U.S. 73, 5 S.Ct. 377, 28 L.Ed. 927 (1885); Goldey
v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, 15 S.Ct. 559, 39 L.Ed. 517 (1895); Southern R.
Co. v. Allison, 190 U.S. 326, 23 S.Ct. 713, 47 L.Ed. 1078 (1903); Courtney v. Pradt,
196 U.S. 89, 25 S.Ct. 208, 49 L.Ed. 398 (1905).
38. Railroaa Company v. Whitton's Admr., 80 U.S. 270, 20 L.Ed. 571 (1872).
39. Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U.S. 80, 25 L.Ed. 407 (1879).
40. Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U.S. 73, 5 S.Ct. 377, 28 L.Ed. 927 (1885); Franz v.
Wahl, 81 Fed. 9 (D.C.E.D. Ark. 1897).
41. Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10, 23 L.Ed. 524 (1875).
42. Webb v. Southern Ry. Co., 235 Fed. 578 (D.C.S.D. Ala. 1916), reversed
on other grounds 248 Fed. 618 (C.C.A. 5th, 1918), cert. denied 247 U.S. 518, 38
S.Ct. 582, 62 L.Ed. 1245 (1918).
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is really a defendant." The requirements of federal jurisdiction
being present and available to the petitioning party, it has been
held that removal could not be prevented by state statutes which
fix the form of judicial review; 44 which provide that proceedings
of a party failing to pay the costs of a motion should halt until
payment;4 5 which restrict the method of condemnation under em-
inent domain;46 or which call for trial without jury in workmen's
compensation cases, when the Seventh Amendment would require
a jury in the federal court.47
State Statutes Obstructing Removal by Foreign Corporations
One of the chief attacks on the right of removal has been the
enactment by a few states of statutes contemplating a denial of
that privilege to a foreign corporation doing business within the
state. The first method, declared invalid in Home Insurance Co.
v. Morse,48 was to require that as a prerequisite to doing business
in the state, the foreign corporation must sign an agreement not
to remove any action into the federal court when sued in the state
courts. On error to the highest state court, the United States Su-
preme Court declared this act unconstitutional as taking from the
nonresident person a right conferred by a valid act of Congress,
namely, his right to sue in the federal court in a proper case of di-
versity of citizenship. A state statute cannot thus limit the powers
of the federal courts by requiring in advance a waiver of the right
to remove, though it was left open whether it could keep the cor-
poration out of the state altogether, or make other reasonable reg-
ulations respecting it. Every subsequent case has recognized this
principle of the Morse decision, that a state cannot require an ad-
vance waiver of the entire right of removal, however much these
43. Chicago, M. and St. P. Ry. Co. v. Drainage Dist. No. 8, 253 Fed. 491
(D.C.S.D. Iowa 1917).
44. Iowa Loan and Trust Co. v. Fairweather, 252 Fed. 605 (D.C.S.D. Iowa
1918).
45. Hulbert v. Russo, 64 Fed. 8 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1894).
46. Warren v. Wisconsin Valley R. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 17,204 (C.C.W.D.
Wis. 1875).
47. McLaughlin v. Western Union Tel. Co., 7 F. (2d) 177 (D.C.E.D. La.
1925).
48. 87 U.S. 445, 22 L.Ed. 365 (1874). Other state acts concerned chiefly with
the regulation of service on foreign corporations doing business in the state,
and not with preventing removal, were upheld in state courts; these decisions
would probably be approved by the federal Supreme Court. Herryford v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 42 Mo. 148 (1868); submission by a nonresident insurance cor-
poration to the state statute on service of process on a local agent, does not
impair its right of removal under federal acts. Accord, Hobbs v. Manhattan
Ins. Co., 56 Me. 417, 96 Am. Dec. 472 (1869); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Dickin-
son, 40 Ind. 444, 13 Am. Rep. 295 (1872).
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cases might differ on the validity of a statute which revoked the
corporation's license for effecting a removal.
A view which received some support for a number of years,
was first presented in Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co. 49 Here
the Court pointed out that the states were recognized as being
able to impose reasonable terms and conditions preliminary to
granting permission to corporations to do business Within their
borders, 0 and then the Court attempted to confine the Morse case
to its own facts by declaring that it did not cover the question of
a state's power to revoke a license already granted. Considering
the revocation of the license as a mere correlative of the acknowl-
edged right of complete exclusion or the imposition of such con-
ditions as the state may wish, the majority pronounced valid the
act calling for revocation of the license because of the removal.
That permission was given to do indirectly what the Morse case
forbade the states to do directly (i.e., to prevent removal) was
denied on the ground that the corporation was not forced to give
up its remedy of removal, but was simply given the option of
either remaining in the state court or ceasing to do business in the
state. The dissent considered the Morse case as governing, and
felt that the reasoning of the prevailing opinion made a distinction
without a difference.
The Doyle case was in its turn limited to its facts by Barton v.
Burnside."' This case lines up with the Morse case on the propo-
sition that a state cannot limit federal jurisdiction by forcing a
corporation to agree in advance to forego removal in order to do
business there, leaving the rule of the Doyle case as permitting the
state to revoke its license when removal was made, with no ad-
vance waiver required. In Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Denton52 there
was a further whittling down of the Doyle case, with an affirma-
tion of the principle that a state cannot by legislative declaration
force a foreign corporation to become a local one by merely con-
forming to local registration statutes. Then came Security Mut.
49. 94 U.S. 535, 24 L.Ed. 148 (1877).
50. Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404, 15 L.Ed. 451 (1855);
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 19 L.Ed. 357 (1868); Ducat v. Chicago, 77 U.S.
410, 19 L.Ed. 972 (1870).
51. 121 U.S. 186, 7 S.Ct. 931, 30 L.Ed. 915 (1887).
52. 146 U.S. 202, 13 S.Ct. 44, 36 L.Ed. 943 (1892). St. Louis and San Fran-
cisco Ry. Co. v. James, 161 U.S. 545, 16 S.Ct. 621, 40 L.Ed. 802 (1896); Rece v.
Newport and Miss. Valley News Co., 32 W. Va. 164, 9 S.E. 212, 3 L.R.A. 572
(1889). Distinguish actual local reincorporation: Memphis and Charleston R.
Co. v. Alabama, 107 U.S. 581, 2 S.Ct. 432, 27 L.Ed. 711 (1882).
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Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt"8 which affirmed the rule of the Doyle case
that although a state statute cannot exact from a foreign corpora-
tion entering the state the promise not to remove to the federal
courts, it can provide for revocation of the license to do business
in the state when such removal is made.14 To the same effect was
National Council v. State Council.55
A series of cases followed, hedging in the Doyle and Prewitt
rule and culminating in its overruling in Terral v. Burke Const.
Co.56 First, Southern R. Co. v. Allison57 held that compliance by a
foreign corporation with the state's regulations for doing business
does not make it a citizen thereof for purposes of federal jurisdic-
tion. Next, Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas58 distinguished the
Prewitt case on the ground that the business of the insurance com-
pany there involved was not interstate commerce, thus bringing
in the many cases which forbid the states to lay an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce. This was a violation of the Con-
stitution, and came within the statement of the Prewitt case that
in imposing conditions on the incoming corporation, the state may
not effect any regulation which violates the federal Constitution.
Herndon v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.5  contributed the idea that
the revocation statute did not regulate or exclude a foreign cor-
poration, but actually banished a corporation already doing a law-
ful business, simply because it had exercised its legal privilege
to resort to a federal court to pass on a case having the proper re-
quirements. There was no such penalty imposed on a domestic
corporation suing in the federal courts, and such discrimination
invalidated the statute. 0 In Harrison v. St. Louis, & S. F. R. Co.6 1
the principle was affirmed that the determination of federal juris-
diction belongs to the federal courts, and that the imposition of
heavy penalties on the foreign corporation for submitting the pe-
tition of removal is inoperative to prevent the exercise of a con-
stitutional privilege.
62
53. 202 U.S. 246, 26 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed. 1013, 6 Ann. Cas. 317 (1906).
54. Followed in State v. Hodges, 114 Ark. 155, 169 S.W. 942, L.R.A. 1916F
122 (1914).
55. 203 U.S. 151, 27 S.Ct. 46, 51 L.Ed. 132 (1906).
56. 257 U.S. 529, 42 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed. 352, 21 A.L.R. 186 (1922).
57. 190 U.S. 326, 23 S.Ct. 713, 47 L.Ed. 1078 (1903).
58. 216 U.S. 1, 30 S.Ct. 190, 54 L.Ed. 355 (1910).
59. 218 U.S. 135, 30 S.Ct. 633, 54 L.Ed. 970 (1910).
60. To the same effect, see Swanger v. Atchison, T. and S. F. Ry. Co., 218
U.S. 159, 30 S.Ct. 639, 54 L.Ed. 978 (1910); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Julian,
169 Fed. 166 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1909).
61. 232 U.S. 318, 34 S.Ct. 333, 58 L.Ed. 621, L.R.A. 1915F 1187 (1914).
62. Followed in Donald v. Philadelphia and Reading Coal & Iron Co., 241
U.S. 329, 36 S.Ct. 563, 60 L.Ed. 1027 (1916).
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Finally, Terral v. Burke Const. Co. put a quietus upon such
state statutes. The court upheld the granting of an injunction
against the threatened revocation under state statute of the license
of a corporation to do business in Arkansas, finding in a review of
the cases that the more recent ones forbade state interference
with removal rights, whether by requiring an advance waiver of
the right, or by threatening withdrawal of the license to do busi-
ness for making a removal.
". [the principle of these cases] rests on the ground that the
Federal Constitution confers upon citizens of one State the
right to resort to federal courts in another, that state action,
whether legislative or executive, necessarily calculated to cur-
tail the free exercise of the right thus secured is void because
the sovereign power of a State in excluding foreign corpora-
tions, as in the exercise of all others of its sovereign powers, is
subject to the limitations of the supreme fundamental law."6
The Doyle and Prewitt cases were then expressly overruled, and
the long conflict settled, with earlier cases on both sides retaining
only historical significance.
The outcome of a recent case14 makes it at least possible that
the power of taxation may in the future be used as a weapon to
force alien corporations to reincorporate within the state, and so
to lose the power to remove. If the license tax for doing business
in a state can be figured on the basis of all the units possessed by
the foreign corporation in the entire country, it will not be diffi-
cult for officials of large corporations to decide whether to reincor-
porate those units within the state, so as to reduce the number of
units by which the tax is measured. If this scheme were success-
ful, it would probably have the incidental effect of preventing the
local company from removing an action commenced by a resident
of that state.
Individual Waiver
It has already been pointed out that advance waiver of re-
moval in all future cases cannot be extorted from a corporation
as a condition for the grant of a license to do business in a state.6 5
The rule is equally unquestioned that after suit has been started
63. Terral v. Burke Const. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532-583, 42 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed.
352, 21 A.L.R. 186 (1922).
64. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 57 S.Ct.
772, 81 L.Ed. 1193, 112 A.L.R. 293 (1937).
65. Home. Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 22 L.Ed. 365 (1874), and cases en-
dorsing that principle cited above.
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in the state court, the right of removal may be waived by one of
the parties, the right being a personal privilege and not a matter
of public policy.6 Such waiver may be either express, 7 or implied
from failure to ask for removal properly.8 It has even been held
that the defendant can withdraw his removal petition and bond
inadvertently filed, if the transcript has not been sent to the fed-
eral court. 9
In each case, then, we have the question of whether the party
attempting to remove is prevented from so doing by previous
waiver. If a removable case is presented only after the parties
have stipulated the time of trial in the state court, that does not
prevent removal by the defendant. 70 However, the defendant must
ask for this removal at once, otherwise he impliedly waives that
right by proceeding to trial.7 1 An outright waiver of removal by
the defendant still binds him after an amendment of the original
petition.12 Also, when a case becomes removable for the first time
as a result of evidence showing that a resident defendant was
fraudulently joined by the plaintiff, the nonresident defendant
must again tender its motion and bond of removal, and failure to
do so acts as a waiver.7 8
The right of removal is lost by a motion to discharge an arrest,
which serves as a general appearance, 7 but is not lost by the de-
fendant's appearance and admission of service without personal
summons given him,7 5 or a stipulation between parties by which
the defendant agrees to the state court's having jurisdiction over
66. Wadleigh v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 76 Wis. 439, 45 N.W. 109
(1890).
67. Smithson v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co., 71 Minn. 216, 73 N.W. 853 (1898),
aff'd Whitcomb v. Smithson, 175 U.S. 635, 20 S.Ct. 248, 44 L.Ed. 303 (1900).
68. Lesh v. Bailey, 49 Ind. App. 254, 95 N.E. 341 (1911).
69. Texas and Pac. Ry. Co. v. Davis, 93 Tex. 378, 55 S.W. 562 (1900).
70. Murphy v. Stone and Webster Engineering Corp., 44 Mont. 146, 119
Pac. 717, Ann. Cas. 1913A 1334 (1911). See also Remington v. Central Pac. R.
Co., 198 U.S. 95, 25 S.Ct. 577, 49 L.Ed. 959 (1905), where a petition of removal
was held to be timely when filed as soon as the case became removable by the
plaintiff's amended statement of the amount involved, even if the time for
answer under state practice had passed.
71. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Austin, 135 U.S. 315, 10 S.Ct. 758, 34 L.Ed. 218
(1890); Lesh v. Bailey, 49 Ind. App. 254, 95 N.E. 341 (1911); Golden v. Northern
Pac. Ry. Co., 39 Mont. 435, 104 Pac. 549, 84 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1154, 18 Ann. Cas. 886
(1909).
72. Texas and Pac. R. Co. v. Matkin, 142 S.W. 604 (1912), aff'd 107 Tex.
125, 174 S.W. 1098 (1915).
73. Broadway Coal Mining Co. v. Robinson, 150 Ky. 707, 150 S.W. 1000
(1912).
74. Dart v. Arnis, 19 How. Prac. 429 (N.Y. 1860).
75. Judson v. Knights of the Maccabees, 220 Fed. 1004 (D.C.W.D. N.Y.
1914).
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his person, the latter position not being inconsistent with re-
moval.71 There is, however, an inconsistency between a motion for
removal and a plea in abatement. The former looks to state
court's surrender of its jurisdiction, and the latter to its retaining
the case to determine the plea. Removal cannot be asked in the
event that a plea in abatement is overruled. 77 Likewise, the de-
murrer of a defendant presents the merits of the case to the state
court, and removal should not be allowed after the demurrer is
overruled there. To do so would cause a federal court to pass on
those same issues.7 8 The mere filing of a demurrer does not, how-
ever, prevent removal when no hearing is had on it sufficient to
constitute a passing on the merits of the case.71
Removal is waived when application is made after the time
named in the statute.8 0 This requirement of filing before the time
for first pleadings under state law is not violated by application
after a condemnation proceeding, since such action is not a trial
in a court of record."' Similarly, participation in certain other
hearings on preliminary motions does not prevent removal, such
as the taking of depositions, 2 reference to arbitrators, 3 consent to
the appointment of an auditor, 4 motion for adjournment," a spe-
cial appearance to make a motion in abatement of an attachment, 6
a motion in opposition to the appointment of a receiver87 or favor-
ing his discharge,8 or a motion for dissolution of an injunction.89
76. Southern Pac. Co. v. Stewart, 88 Ga. 13, 13 S.E. 824 (1891).
77. Amy v. Manning, 144 Mass. 153, 10 N.E. 737 (1887), aff'd 140 U.S. 137,
11 S.Ct. 707, 35 L.Ed. 386 (1891).
78. Alley v. Nott, 111 U.S. 472, 4 S.Ct. 495, 28 L.Ed. 491 (1884); Scharff v.
Levy, 112 U.S. 711, 5 S.Ct. 360, 28 L.Ed. 825 (1884).
79. Whiteley Malleable Castings Co. v. Sterlingworth R. Supply Co., 83
Fed. 853 (C.C. Ind, 1897); Duncan v. Associated Press, 81 Fed. 417 (C.C.S.D.
Cal. 1897).
80. Rosenthal v. Coates, 148 U.S. 142, 13 S.Ct. 576, 37 L.Ed. 399 (1893).
81. Town of Waynesville v. Smathers, 194 N.C. 131, 138 S.E. 613 (1927).
82. McMillen v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N.A., 8 F. (2d) 881 (D.C.W.D. Mo.
1925); Scott v. Hull, 14 Ind. 136 (1860).
83. Thorne v. Towanda Tanning Co., 15 Fed. 289 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1882).
84. Stone v. Sargent, 129 Mass. 503 (1880).
85. Fogarty v. Southern Pac. Co., 121 Fed. 941 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1903).
86. Calderhead v. Downing, 103 Fed. 27 (C.C.N.D. Wash. 1900); Purdy v.
Wallace Muller and Co., 81 Fed. 513 (C.C. Mass. 1897); Whiteley Malleable
Castings Co. v. Sterlingworth Railway Supply Co., 83 Fed. 853 (C.C. Ind. 1897);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Stewart, 88 Ga. 13, 13 S.E. 824 (1891). On the other hand,
a state decision in Bell v. Bell, 3 W. Va. 183 (1869) held that the defendant's
appearance to bond an attachment served as consent to the jurisdiction and
waiver of removal.
87. Sidway v. Missouri Land & Live Stock Co., Ltd., 116 Fed. 381 (C.C. Mo.
1902).
88. Franklin v. Wolf, 78 Ga. 446, 3 S.E. 696 (1887).
89. Garrard v. Silver Peak Mines, 76 Fed. 1 (C.C. Nev. 1896); Atlanta, K.
and N. Ry. Co. v. Southern R. Co., 131 Fed. 657 (C.C.A. 6th, 1904), cert. denied
195 U.S. 634, 25 S.Ct. 791, 49 L.Ed. 354 (1904).
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The defendant must except to an order of court extending the
time for pleading. Otherwise he waives the right to remove.90 As
for such an extension by consent of parties, authority is divided,
with no Supreme Court decision on the point. One view is that
removal can be had only within the time for defendant's first
pleading under state law, and the parties cannot agree to extend
this period;91 while the other view allows such a stipulation to ex-
tend the time for removing.92
The right of removal is lost by making a defense in the state
court before filing the petition and bond of removal, 8 by an ap-
plication for a change of venue,94 by a delay in filing the removal
petition and bond until after the time for the defendant's pleading
under state law,95 and by proceeding to trial without calling the
state court's attention to the filing of a petition and bond of re-
moval."" Removal of a separable controversy is waived when the
defendant does not object to the introduction of evidence concern-
ing it in the state court9 ' On the other hand, failure to file the
record in the federal court within the specified time does not
automatically divest its jurisdiction, and that court has the discre-
tion to keep or remand the case. 8
After the defendant has filed a sufficient petition and bond of
removal, which the state court improperly overrules, he can ex-
cept and proceed to present the merits of the case in the state
court without waiving the right of removal. 9 He must be careful
not to ask affirmative relief by a counterclaim, whether set-off or
recoupment, since the act of invoking such aid of the state court
90. Rock Island Nat. Bank v. Keator Lumber Co., 52 Fed. 897 (C.C.N.D.
Ill. 1892); Wilcox and Gibbs Guano Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 60 Fed. 929 (C.C.
S.C. 1894); Schipper v. Consumer Cordage Co., 72 Fed. 803 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1895).
91. Howard v. Southern Ry. Co., 122 N.C. 944, 29 S.E. 778 (1898); Bryson v.
Southern Ry. Co., 141 N.C. 594, 54 S.E. 434 (1906); Dills v. Champion Fiber Co.,
175 N.C. 49, 94 S.E. 694 (1917).
92. Groton Bridge and Mfg. Co. v. Amer. Bridge Co., 137 Fed. 284 (C.C.N.D.
N.Y. 1905).
93. Hudson River Ry. and Terminal Co. v. Day, 54 Fed. 545 (C.C. N.J.
1893); Daugherty v. Sharp, 171 Fed. 466 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1905).
94. First Nat. Bank of Wausau v. Conway, 67 Wis. 210, 30 N.W. 215 (1886).
95. Rosenthal v. Coates, 148 U.S. 142, 13 S.Ct. 576, 37 L.Ed. 399 (1893);
Choctaw, 0. and G. Ry. Co. v. Burgess, 21 Okl. 110, 95 Pac. 606 (1908).
96. Home Ins. Co. v. Curtis, 32 Mich. 402 (1875).
97. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Simmons, 116 Oki. 126, 242 Pac. 151
(1926).
98. Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. 118, 1 S.Ct. 58, 27 L.Ed. 87 (1882).
99. Removal Cases, 100 U.S. 457, 25 L.Ed. 593 (1879); Railroad Co. v. Miss.,
102 U.S. 135, 26 L.Ed. 96 (1880); Kern v. Huidekoper, 103 U.S. 485, 26 L.Ed. 354
(1881); Powers v. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co., 169 U.S. 92, 18 S.Ct. 264, 42
L.Ed. 673 (1898).
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serves as consent to its jurisdiction over the case.100 Presenting his
claims for removal to the state appellate court, however, does not
act as a waiver of the right of removal.'01
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF REMOVAL
What is a "Suit"?
Inasmuch as federal original and removal jurisdiction extends
only to "suits at law and in equity,'10 2 it is necessary to discover
whether a proceeding in the state court qualifies as a suit in the
federal sense before a removal can be made. The test laid down
by Chief Justice Marshall in Weston v. Charleston is as follows:
"Is a writ of prohibition a suit? The term is certainly a
very comprehensive one, and is understood to apply to any
proceeding in a Court of Justice, by which an individual pur-
sues that remedy in a Court of Justice which the law affords
him. The modes of proceedings may be various, but if a right
is litigated between parties in a Court of Justice, the proceed-
ing by which the decision of the Court is sought is a suit."'03
An application for a writ of mandamus to force an executive
department head to do the merely ministerial duty of paying
money authorized by Congress was held to be a suit within the
jurisdiction of a federal court.10 4 The highest state court's decision
on a writ of habeas corpus was held to be a final judgment in a
"suit," so as to give jurisdiction to the Supreme Court on writ of
error.105 As for a condemnation proceeding, a hearing before the
mayor of a city and a jury to settle the value of land seized for a
street is not a "suit" so as to be removable, but it becomes so when
appealed to the state circuit court.10
A probate proceeding is not ordinarily a "suit," but can be-
100. Merchant's Heat and Light Co. v. Clow and Sons, 204 U.S. 286, 27 S.Ct.
265, 51 L.Ed. 488 (1907); Texas and Pac. Ry. Co. v. Eastin and Knox, 214 U.S.
153, 29 S.Ct. 564, 53 L.Ed. 946 (1909).
101. Mecke v. Valley Town Mineral Co., 89 Fed. 209 (C.C.W.D. N.C. 1898);
Texas and P. Ry. Co. v. Davis, 93 Tex. 378, 55 S.W. 562 (1900).
102. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2.
103. 27 U.S. 449, 464, 7 L.Ed. 481 (1829).
104. Kendall v. U.S., 37 U.S. 524, 9 L.Ed. 1181 (1838).
105. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 10 L.Ed. 579 (1840); Ex parte Milli-
gan, 71 U.S. 2, 18 L.Ed. 281 (1866).
106. Pacific R. Removal Cases (Union Pac. R. Co. v. Kansas), 115 U.S. 1,
5 S.Ct. 1113, 29 L.Ed. 319 (1884). See also Kohl v. U.S., 91 U.S. 367, 23 L.Ed. 449
(1875); Mississippi and Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 25 L.Ed.
206 (1878); Searl v. School Dist. No. 2, 124 U.S. 197, 8 S.Ct. 460, 31 L.Ed. 415
(1888); Delaware County v. Diebold Safe and Lock Co., 133 U.S. 473, 10 S.Ct.
399, 33 L.Ed. 674 (1890); Mason City and Fort Dodge Ry. Co. v. Boynton, 204
U.S. 570, 27 S.Ct. 321, 51 L.Ed. 629 (1907).
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come one if a contestation arises and is carried on between the
parties; and when the state law authorizes a suit to annul a will,
the proceeding is a "suit" removable to the federal court if there
is diversity of citizenship between the parties and the requisite
jurisdictional amount is involved. 10 7 The same is true of a pro-
ceeding begun in a state probate court by a creditor against his
debtor's estate, and then removed to a federal court. 0 8
An action for a declaratory judgment, to restrain the sale of
a new prior preference stock under an amendment to the certifi-
cate of incorporation which displaced the right of the holder of the
old preferred stock to cumulative dividends, was held a "suit" and
therefore removable.109 A quo warranto proceeding by a state
against a corporation, when in the form of a civil action, is such a
suit as to be removable, on the ground that the state is a party.""
However, when a hearing in a state county court is had simply to
assess the value of property for taxation purposes, with no ad-
verse issue between the parties, there is no case or controversy
and the proceeding is not removable."'
The federal court will decide for itself whether a suit is pre-
sented or not;" 2 and though a federal court cannot review a state
court's decision that a contract is void on grounds of public policy,
it can pass on whether a state statute violates the federal Consti-
tution when it is claimed that the obligation of an existing con-
tract is impaired. 13 An ever-present limitation is that only a suit
between two parties can be removed, at present only by the de-
fendant" 4-in many cases only by a nonresident defendant. A
state court has held that a claim against an insolvent estate is not
such a suit.115
107. Ellis v. Davis, 109 U.S. 485, 3 S.Ct. 327, 27 L.Ed. 1006 (1883). Accord:
Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10, 23 L.Ed. 524 (1875); Dallas Bank and Trust Co.
v. Holloway, 50 F. (2d) 197 (D.C.N,D. Tex. 1931).
108. Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U.S. 73, 5 S.Ct. 377, 28 L.Ed. 927 (1885).
109. Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corporation, 1 F. Supp. 294 (D.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1932).
110. Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 4 S.Ct. 437, 28 L.Ed. 927 (1884).
111. Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467, 10 S.Ct. 651, 34 L.Ed. 196 (1890).
112. Commissioners of Road Improv. Dist. No. 2 v. St. Louis Southwestern
Ry. Co., 257 U.S. 547, 42 S.Ct. 250, 66 L.Ed. 364 (1922); Madisonville Traction
Co. v. St. Bernard Min. Co., 196 U.S. 239, 25 S.Ct. 251, 49 L.Ed. 462 (1905);
Mason City and Ft. D. R. Co. v. Boynton, 204 U.S. 570, 27 S.Ct. 321, 51 L.Ed.
629 (1907).
113. Delmas v. Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co., 81 U.S. 661, 20 L.Ed. 757 (1872);
Northwestern University v. Illinois, 99 U.S. 309, 25 L.Ed. 387 (1879).
114. West v. Aurora City, 73 U.S. 139, 18 L.Ed. 819 (1868).
115. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 110 Mass. 229 (1872).
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Potentiality of Originality
Prior to the Act of 1887-88, there was no express provision of
law limiting removal to cases of which a federal court had original
jurisdiction, but such a requirement was held to be implied under
the Judiciary Act of 1789.116 However, no such necessity was found
under the Act of 1867. The question is now settled by that section
of the Act of 1887-88 which provides that removal is allowed in
cases ". . . of which the district courts of the United States are
given original jurisdiction. 11 -7 A variety of cases have since been
examined to discover if all essentials of original federal jurisdic-
tion are present.1 8
The district in which removal is had-venue-does not at
present come under this rule. The venue provision is that
"... no civil suit shall be brought in any district court against
any person by any original process or proceeding in any other
district than that whereof he is an inhabitant; but where the
jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is be-
tween citizens of different States, suit shall be brought only in
the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the de-
fendant.""' ,
The first group of cases (until 1906) held this statement not to
apply to removal; and, if any federal court had jurisdiction over
the subject-matter of the case, the defendant could waive either
his right to object to lack of service on himself 20 or to suit being
in a district other than the residence of one of the parties,1 21 and
this waiver was made when the defendant removed the action.122
State decisions of that period likewise recognized such a waiver
by defendant of objections to venue.128
116. Smith v. Rines, 22 Fed. Cas. No. 13,100 (C.C. Mass. 1836); Beardsley
v. Torrey, 2 Fed. Cas. No. 1,190 (C.C. Pa. 1822); Ward v. Arredondo, 29 Fed.
Cas. No. 17,148 (C.C. N.Y. 1825).
117. Judicial Code, § 28, 28 U.S.C.A. § 71 (1926).
118. Mexican Nat. R. Co. v. Davidson, 157 U.S. 201, 15 S.Ct. 563, 89 L.Ed. 672
(1895); Arkansas v. Kansas and T. Coal Co., 183 U.S. 185, 22 S.Ct. 47, 46 L.Ed.
144 (1901); Boston and Mont. Consol. Copper Min. Co. v. Montana Ore Pur-
chasing Co., 188 U.S. 632, 23 S.Ct. 434, 47 L.Ed. 626 (1903); Minnesota v. North-
ern Securities Co., 194 U.S. 48, 24 S.Ct. 598, 42 L.Ed. 870 (1904); In re Dunn,
212 U.S. 874, 29 S.Ct. 299, 53 L.Ed. 558 (1909).
119. Judicial Code, § 51, 28 U.S.C.A. § 112 (Supp. 1938).
120. Pollard v. Dwight, 8 U.S. 421, 2 L.Ed. 666 (1808).
121. Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369, 24 L.Ed. 853 (1877).
122. Gracie v. Palmer, 21 U.S. 699, 5 L.Ed. 719 (1823); Interior Constr. and
Improvement Co. v. Gibney, 160 U.S. 217, 16 S.Ct. 272, 40 L.Ed. 401 (1895).
123. American Finance Co. v. Bostwick, 151 Mass. 19, 23 N.E. 656 (1890);
Craven v. Turner, 82 Me. 383, 19 Atl. 864 (1890); Koshland v. National Fire
Ins. Co., 31 Ore. 205, 49 Pac. 845 (1897); Duff v. Hildreth, 183 Mass. 440, 67 N.E.
356 (1903).
[Vol. I
FEDERAL REMOVAL JURISDICTION
Then, in 1906, Ex parte Wisner"14 held that a suit in a state
court in a district other than the residence of one party could not
be removed for diversity of citizenship, at least when the plaintiff
objected. These last words pointed the way for the partial over-
ruling of the Wisner decision two years later by In re Moore,
which held that the objection to venue could be waived by the
parties: the defendant by removing, and the plaintiff by express
waiver or an act amounting to waiver.'2 5 With the limitation that
venue could be waived by both parties, the Wisner rule was gen-
erally applied by the lower federal courts,1' 6 and by the state
courts,'127 with some exceptions. 128 However, this rule was not
destined to last.
The overruling of the Wisner case was foreshadowed in Gen-
eral -Investment Co. v. Lake Shore and Mich. So. Ry. Co., 29 which
criticized the application of the venue provision to removal cases
possessing jurisdictional requirements. Finally Lee v. Chesapeake
and Ohio Ry. Co. removed the last vestige of the Wisner rule.
"It will be perceived that the right of removal under § 28
arises whenever a suit within the general jurisdiction of the
District Courts is begun in 'any' state court, and also that the
party to whom the right is given is designated in direct and
unequivocal terms. Where the suit arises under the Constitu-
tion, or a law or treaty, of the United States the right is given
to 'the defendant or defendants' without any qualifications;
and as to 'any other suit' it is given to 'the defendant or defend-
ants', if he or they be 'non-residents of that State.' In neither
instance is the plaintiff's assent essential in any sense to the ex-
ercise of the right. Nor is it admissible for him to urge that
the removal be into the District Court for some other district,
124. 203 U.S. 449, 27 S.Ct. 150, 51 L.Ed. 264 (1906).
125. 209 U.S. 490, 28 S.Ct. 585, 52 L.Ed. 904, 14 Ann. Cas. 1164 (1908). The
same waiver by both parties was announced in In re Winn, 213 U.S. 458, 29
S.Ct. 515, 53 L.Ed. 873 (1909).
126. Foulk v. Gray, 120 Fed. 156 (C.C.S.D. W. Va. 1902); Isaac Kubie Co.
v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 261 Fed. 806 (D.C. N.J. 1919); Nickels v. Pullman Co.,
268 Fed. 610 (D.C.W.D. Va. 1920).
127. Louisville and N. R. Co. v. Garnett, 129 Miss. 795, 93 So. 241 (1922);
Ft. Smith and W. R. Co. v. Knott, 60 Okla. 175, 159 Pac. 847 (1916); Riter-
Conley Mfg. Co. v. O'Donnell, 64 Okla. 229, 168 Pac. 49 (1917); Powell v. So.
Ry. Co., 110 S.C. 70, 96 S.E. 292 (1918); Gist v. Equitable Surety Co., 161 Wis.
79, 151 S.W. 382 (1915).
128. Louisville and N. R. R. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 218 Fed. 91
(D.C.E.D. Ky. 1914); Hohenburg v. Mobile Liners, Inc., 245 Fed. 169 (D.C.S.D.
Ala. 1917); Earles v. Germain Co., 265 Fed. 715 (D.C.S.D. Ala. 1920).
129. 260 U.S. 261, 43 S.Ct. 106, 67 L.Ed. 244 (1922).
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for it is his act in bringing the suit in a state court within the
particular district which fixes the venue on removal."'10
This decision has since been followed. 1'3
Service by Attachment and Substituted Service under
State Process
There is no statutory provision for beginning an action in the
federal court by attachment of the defendant's property without
personal service also on defendant. However, when jurisdiction
by attachment is once secured by the state court in accordance
with state laws, a removal can be had to the federal court with
this control retained-another example of removal jurisdiction
being wider than original jurisdiction.' Such removal can be
made even though the garnishment proceeding in the state court
was, equitable in form.'88 Removal can be made by either the de-
fendant or a garnishee.134
If personal service was not had on the defendant in the state
court, but only service by publication, the attachment cannot be
dissolved because federal practice makes no provision for it. The
case stands as if it were still in the state court whose rule is ap-
plied as to attachments without personal service.13 5 A state court
has recognized that a removal based on attachment under state
laws is valid.136
The test of whether jurisdiction, secured by substituted ser-
vice only in the state court, can be retained on removal, is not
whether it conforms to federal practice provisions but whether
it can be called reasonable and in accordance with due process
under the United States Constitution. For example, where the
defendant was given two months in which to file pleadings, with
130. 260 U.S. 653, 658, 43 S.Ct. 230, 67 L.Ed. 443 (1923). See Notes (1923) 9
Va. L. Rev. 552; (1923) 32 Yale L. J. 747; (1923) 8 St. Louis L. Rev. 194; (1923)
71 U. Pa. L. Rev. 242; Bryan, Two Important Reversals (1923) 8 Va. L. Reg.
(N.S,) 901.
131. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Galbreath Cattle Co., 271 U.S. 99, 46 S.Ct.
439, 70 L.Ed. 854 (1926) (suit is removable when at least one of the two alleged
grounds of diversity of citizenship and federal question is well-founded, al-
though neither party resides in the district of removal). Accord: Louisville
and N. R. Co. v. Garnett, 132 Miss. 468, 96 So. 519 (1923).
132. Clark v. Wells, 203 U.S. 164, 27 S.Ct. 43, 51 L.Ed. 138 (1906); Craddock
v. Fulton, 140 Fed. 426 (C.C.N.D. W. Va. 1905); Missouri Valley Bridge and
Iron Co. v. Blake, 231 Fed. 417 (C.C.A. 4th, 1916); Alabama Power Co. v. Greg-
ory Hill Gold Mining Co., 5 F. (2d) 705 (D.C.M.D. Ala. 1925).
133. Courtney v. Pradt, 196 U.S. 89, 25 S.Ct. 208, 49 L.Ed. 398 (1905).
134. Greevy v. Jacob Tome Institute, 132 Fed. 408 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1904).
135. Blumberg v. A. B. and E.L. Shaw Co., 131 Fed. 608 (C.C.S.D. N.Y.
1904).
136. Coffin v. Harris, 141 N.C. 707, 54 S.E. 437, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 624 (1906).
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provision for notice to him of the pendency of the suit, the pro-
ceeding was declared reasonable and in accordance with due pro-
cess, and jurisdiction so secured was retained on removal."' On
the other hand, it has been ruled that where state law is so un-
reasonable as to require the nonresident defendant to answer
within five days of the order, the federal court will not recognize
jurisdiction acquired under it, and removal cannot be made.138
Venue of Federal Question Cases, Railroad Corporation Cases, and
Local Actions
It will be recalled that prior to the decision of Lee v. Chesa-
peake and Ohio Ry., the rule respecting venue in diversity of citi-
zenship cases prevented removal to a district not the residence of
one of the parties. Analogously, some lower federal courts in that
period declared that where the defendant in a case involving a
federal question was a citizen of a state other than that in which
suit was brought, an otherwise removable case could not be re-
moved against the plaintiff's objection, since suit could not have
originally been brought in that district. 139 The prevailing opinion
is now different on this point also; and when the action pending
in a state court involves the federal Constitution or a federal
statute, the fact that the defendant is a nonresident of that state
and could not have been sued there originally does not prevent
him from waiving his benefit under the venue section,' 40 which
he does by his petition for removal. 141
As for the venue of a suit involving a railroad corporation
created under the laws of a state, original suit in a federal court
on diversity of citizenship by a citizen of another state must be in
the home district of one party and cannot be in a third state where
the defendant corporation merely does business. 12 The opinions of
137. Hudson Nav. Co. v. Murray, 236 Fed. 419 (D.C. N.J. 1916), in which
the court placed great reliance on Clark v. Wells, 203 U.S. 164, 27 S.Ct. 43, 51
L.Ed. 138 (1906).
138. Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 20 S.Ct. 410, 44 L.Ed. 520 (1900).
139. Canary Oil Co. v. Standard Asphalt & Rubber Co., 182 Fed. 663 (C.C.D.
Kan. 1909); Orr v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 242 Fed. 608 (D.C.S.D. N.Y. 1914);
Boise Commercial Club v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 260 Fed. 769 (C.C.A. 9th,
1919), writ of error dismissed 255 U.S. 578, 41 S.Ct. 322, 65 L.Ed. 795 (1921).
140. Judicial Code, § 51, 28 U.S.C.A. § 112 (Supp. 1938).
141. General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore and M. S. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 261, 43
S.Ct. 106, 67 L.Ed. 244 (1922); Rubber & Celluloid Harness Trimming Co. v.
John L. Whiting-J. J. Adams Co., 210 Fed. 393 (D.C.D. Mass. 1913); Atlantic
Corporation v. U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, 286 Fed.
222 D.C.D. N.H. 1923).
142. Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Denton, 146 U.S. 202, 13 S.Ct. 44, 36 L.Ed. 942
(1892); Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444, 12 S.Ct. 935, 36 L.Ed. 768
(1892); In re Keasbey and Mattison Company, 160 U.S. 221, 16 S.Ct. 273, 40
L.Ed. 402 (1895).
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the lower federal courts are divided on the question of the re-
moval of such a case. One view maintains that the venue provi-
sion requires the suit to be brought in the home district of one of
the parties, which in the case of the corporation is the state in
which it was incorporated, and not merely where business is
done. 143 The other view, and the one probably to be followed now
that the Lee case has shown the way, is that the doing of business
in a state constitutes such residence as to allow suit in the state
court, after which defendant can as a nonresident secure a removal
without consent of the plaintiff, thereby waiving his objections to
suit in a district where neither party resides.144
Another case of proper venue in a district where neither party
lives is the suit to remove a cloud on the title of land, with pro-
vision for the securing of jurisdiction over a nonresident defend-
ant's interest in the land.14 5 Thus, even, though neither party
resides where such a suit is brought, removal to a federal court
may be had. 4 6 To sustain this jurisdiction, the court must be able
to grant full relief in rem, considering the bill as a whole.147 A suit
by stockholders to set aside an election of officers claimed to be
void, and to have a receiver appointed for property in the state of
a mining company created elsewhere, was held removable as a
local action to enforce a claim to property situated within the dis-
trict, under the above-mentioned local action statute.148
Effect of Change in Circumstances
It has been pointed out that the removability of a case arising
under a federal law is determined from the plaintiff's petition,
and the defendant cannot in his removal petition supply a defi-
ciency therein.1 49 Furthermore, the plaintiff has considerable lati-
tude in deciding whether he will sue the defendants jointly or
separately, and in the absence of fraud a nonresident defendant
cannot have the action against him separated from that against a
143. Stone v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 195 Fed. 832 (D.C.W.D. Mo. 1912).
144. Bogue v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 193 Fed. 728 (D.C.S.D. Iowa 1912).
145. Judicial Code, § 57, 28 U.S.C.A. § 118 (1926).
146. Gillespie v. Pocahontas Coal & Coke Co., 162 Fed. 742 (C.C.S.D. W. Va.
1907), reversed on other grounds 163 Fed. 992 (C.C.A. 4th, 1908), certiorari
denied 214 U.S. 519, 29 S.Ct. 700, 53 L.Ed. 1065 (1909).
147. O'Neil v. Birdseye, 244 Fed. 254 (D.C.S.D. N.Y. 1917).
148. Consolidated Interstate Callahan Mining Co. v. Callahan Mining Co.,
228 Fed. 528 (D.C.D. Idaho 1915).
149. Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 14 S.Ct. 654, 38 L.
Ed. 511 (1894); Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 34 S.Ct. 724, 58 L.Ed. 1218
(1914). However, defendant is not bound by plaintiff's allegation of defend-
ant's citizenship: Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cody, 166 U.S. 606, 17 S.Ct. 703, 41
L.Ed. 1132 (1897).
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resident so as to secure a removal.150 Even if the evidence has
shown no case against the resident defendant who was joined in
good faith, and the court has dismissed the case against the plain-
tiff's will, the nonresident defendant still cannot remove, although
he could have done so but for the joinder; 15' nor does an involun-
tary nonsuit eliminate the resident defendant sufficiently to per-
mit the nonresident to remove.'52
In state decisions, it has been held that affirmation by the
appellate court of a judgment against the resident defendant, and
the granting of a new trial to the nonresident, does not create a
separable controversy allowing removal on his new trial.15  It
has also been held that a temporary injunction (an ancillary rem-
edy) in the state court does not produce a change which would
permit removal of a case not originally removable;5 4 and that the
removability of the case is determined from the record at the time
of application, with the state court having no discretion to deny
removal if the facts justify it.1 5 As if to emphasize the fact that
only the plaintiff's voluntary action makes the case removable
when it is not so originally, an amendment or a supplementing of
plaintiff's pleadings may effect removability even when federal
jurisdiction did not at first exist. 56
When Is a Case in a Condition to Be Removed?
Until there is a suit pending in the state court, there can be
no removal. Thus, no suit arising under the Constitution or laws
of the United States was shown when the issue was whether the
person served by plaintiff was really an agent of the defendant
corporation so that service could be made on him. No case was
"brought" until that question was settled, and no removal could
be had.15  On the other hand, a suit was "brought" when a petition
150. Kansas City Suburban Belt Railway Company v. Herman, 187 U.S.
63, 23 S.Ct. 24, 47 L.Ed. 76 (1902); Alabama Great Southern Ry. Co. v. Thomp-
son, 200 U.S. 206, 26 S.Ct. 161, 50 L.Ed. 441, 4 Ann. Cas. 1147 (1906); Great
Northern Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 38 S.Ct. 237, 62 L.Ed. 713 (1918),
dismissing writ of error to review 51 Mont. 565, 154 Pac. 914 (1916).
151. Lathrop, Shea & Henwood Co. v. Interior Const. & Imp. Co., 215 U.S.
246, 30 S.Ct. 76, 54 L.Ed. 177 (1909).
152. American Car & Foundry Co. v. Kettelhake, 236 U.S. 311, 35 S.Ct. 355,
59 L.Ed. 594 (1915).
153. Gurley v. Southern Power Co., 173 N.C. 447, 92 S.E. 262 (1917).
154. North Carolina Public Service Co. v. Southern Power Co., 181 N.C.
356, 107 S.E. 226 (1921).
155. Texarkana Telephone Co. v. Bridges, 75 Ark. 116, 86 S.W. 841 (1905).
156. Allen v. New York, P. & N. R. Co., 15 F. (2d) 532 (C.C.A. 4th, 1926),
certiorari denied 273 U.S. 756, 47 S.Ct. 459, 71 L.Ed. 876 (1927).
157. Germania Insurance Co. v. Wisconsin, 119 U.S. 473, 7 S.Ct. 260, 30
L.Ed. 461 (1886); People's Ins. Co. v, Wisconsin, 119 U.S. 477, 7 S.Ct. 262, 30 L.
Ed. 462 (1886).
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for a preliminary injunction could be had, with the parties sub-
jected to judicial order.158 A suit against an infant was not re-
movable when attempted by the father as next friend before there
had been service in the state court on the infant personally or by
substitution, since there is no provision in federal law for service
on an infant by substitution or publication, and such failure to
serve the infant by state process cannot be waived by him or his
guardian. 15 ' A removal made by defendants who have been served
is valid, despite the fact that the summons is not served on all de-
fendants; 16° but it has been held that where two corporations are
parties on the same side, the federal court cannot take jurisdiction
of the case until both have been served. 161 However, when diver-
sity of citizenship exists between parties, and the plaintiff asks for
a removal as allowed by the 1875 Act, it cannot be prevented by
equities and contentions existing between the defendants.1 62 The
time for determining removability is when the petition for re-
moval is filed, which can be done at any time after plaintiff's
petition is filed with the intention that process be issued on it
immediately.""
The filing of a petition of intervention does not start a suit
that can be removed until some service of process is made; 16 and
not until the complainant in an interpleader suit in a state court
has been dismissed can the diversity of citizenship existing be-
tween the defendants be used as a ground of removal because the
complainant who has the same citizenship as some defendants is
more than a nominal party. 65 The fact that a state court has
seized the res does not prevent removal, 6 nor does an injunction
by the state court against further infringements of plaintiff's pat-
ent have this effect since future applications for injunctions can
be made to tle federal court. 67
Only an actual controversy can be removed from the state
court. Thus, it has been held that there was a controversy where
158. English v. Supreme Conclave Improved Order of Heptasophs, 235
Fed. 630 (D.C.D.N.J. 1916).
159. Woolridge v. McKenna, 8 Fed. 650 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1881).
160. Parkinson v. Barr, 105 Fed. 81 (C.C.D. Nev. 1900); Walker v. Rich-
ards, 55 Fed. 129 (C.C.D. Minn. 1893).
161. Pond v. Sibley, 7 Fed. 129 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1881).
162. Tarver v. Ficklin, 60 Ga. 373 (1878).
163. Rodgers v. Gaines Bros. Co., 295 S.W. 492 (Mo. App. 1927).
164. In re Receivership of Iowa and Minnesota Construction Co., 6 Fed.
799 (C.C.D. Iowa 1881).
165. Leonard v. Jamison, 2 Edw. Ch. 136 (N.Y. 1831).
166. Osgood v. Chicago, D. & V. R. Co., 18 Fed. Cas. No. 10,604 (C.C.N.D.
Ill. 1875).
167. Byan v. Stevens, 4 Edw. Ch. 119 (N.Y. 1842).
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the parties had filed a stipulation admitting the claim sued on,",
where the plaintiff had dismissed his action without prejudice, 6"
where a summons was issued to a nonresident defendant for an
examination to secure facts from which to frame a complaint,17 0
and where the defendant's failure to answer in time has put him
in default."' Under the 1875 Act, the Iowa court held there was no
controversy between citizens of different states until the de-
fendant filed an answer or demurrer to the complaint, and no
removal could be made until that time."72 On the other hand, the
federal courts have held that a controversy is presumed from the
mere filing of the petition, and that an answer need not be made
in order to render the case removable.178 A controversy concern-
ing the state court's jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the
case is enough to permit removal.17 4
Procedure, Actions by a State, and Equity Suits
A case having all the requisites of original federal jurisdiction
can be removed in spite of procedure that would have prevented
an original suit in a federal court,175 especially if the federal court
has the power to follow the procedure prescribed by state law.:7
When a case is otherwise removable, removal is not prevented by
the awkward form of the case in the state court, as where the
plaintiff's assessment book was filed in a way that would not have
been allowed on original suit in a federal court.1 77 The fact that
the action must be begun in a state court does not preclude a later
removal,178 nor does the fact that state procedure under the
Workmen's Compensation Act calls for trial without a jury,
whereas this would be necessary in a federal court. 79
Even when a state, acting in its sovereign capacity, could not
168. Keith v. Levi, 2 Fed. 743, 1 McCrary 343 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1880).
169. New England Mortg. Sec. Co. v. Aughe, 12 Neb. 504, 11 N.W. 753 (1882).
170. Shepard v. Conrad, 4 Abb. N.C. 254 (N.Y. 1878).
171. Berrian v. Chetwood, 9 Fed. 678 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1881).
172. Stanbrough v. Griffin, 52 Iowa 112, 2 N.W. 1011 (1879); Bosler v. Booge,
54 Iowa 251, 6 N.W. 301 (1880); Flynn v. Des Moines & St. L. Ry. Co., 63 Iowa
490, 19 N.W. 312 (1884).
173. Memphis Say. Bank v. Houchens, 115 Fed. 96 (C.C.A. 8th, 1902); Hod-
son v. Lake Shore & M. R. Co., 12 Fed. Cas. No. 6, 571a (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1881);
Egan v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 53 Fed. 675 (C.C.N.D. Iowa 1893).
174. Auracher v. Omaha & St. L. R. Co., 102 Fed. 1 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1900).
175. In re Stutsman County, 88 Fed. 337 (C.C.D.N.D.S.E.D. 1898).
176. Colorado Midland Ry. Co. v. Jones, 29 Fed. 193 (C.C.D. Col. 1886);
Banigan v. City of Worcester, 30 Fed. 392 (C.C.D. Mass. 1887).
177. Commissioners of Road Imp. Dist. No. 2 of Lafayette County, Ark.
v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 257 U.S. 547, 47 S.Ct. 250, 66 L.Ed. 364 (1922).
178. Myers v. Chicago N. W. Ry. Co., 118 Iowa 312, 91 N.W. 1076 (1902).
179. McLaughlin v. Western Union Tel. Co., 7 F. (2d) 177 (D.C.E.D. La.
1925).
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have been sued originally in the federal court, its action against
a corporation to question the right to do business in the state can
be removed.180 There can be no removal of a state's suit for diver-
sity of citizenship, however, since a state has no citizenship, but
if a federal question is presented by the petition, the defendant
can remove.1 8 '
A federal court sitting in equity lacks jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of a suit by a simple contract creditor to vacate a
fraudulent conveyance of the debtor, and such a suit in a state
court cannot be removed by the plaintiff on objection of defend-
ant.18 2 Yet, it has been held that the defendant may waive the
objection to a suit by a simple contract creditor for the appoint-
ment of a receiver, and does so by removing.1s3 When a defendant
has removed a suit wherein the state equity court had full power
under state law to grant an attachment on real estate to satisfy a
judgment, the federal court would not dismiss the case on the
ground of lack of equity in a federal court to give such relief.8 4
In other equity cases, removal has been permitted where state
practice authorized suit on a contract of one defendant to assume
the liability of the other defendant to the plaintiff; 185 where the
plaintiff alleged that the defendants were in possession of his an-
cestor's deed, but did not allege facts as a basis for asking its
delivery to him, nor did he ask such relief;8 6 where the suit was
to enforce a lien previously acquired by legal proceedings;8 7
where a trustee in bankruptcy sued to recover a sum paid in pref-
erence;'88 and where the defendant presented a legal rather than
an equitable claim. 89 As for procedure, Marshall v. Holmes'90
held that if the case is in its nature removable, the state court
must permit it to be taken to the federal court. The latter court
then decides whether the equity powers should be exercised to
enjoin the defendant from enforcing judgments obtained by fraud,
180. Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 4 S.Ct. 437, 26 L.Ed. 482 (1884).
181. State v. Frost, 113 Wis. 623, 89 N.W. 915 (1902).
182. Cates v. Allen, 149 U.S. 451, 13 S.Ct. 883, 37 L.Ed. 804 (1893); First Nat.
Bank of Parkersburg v. Prager, 91 Fed. 689 (C.C.A. 4th, 1899).
183. Finney v. Continental Baking & Milling Corporation, 17 F. (2d) 107
(D.C.D. Ind. 1927).
184. Miller v. Williams, 258 Fed. 216 (C.C.A. 4th, 1919).
185. Collins Mfg. Co. v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 14 F. (2d) 871 (D.C.D.
Mass. 1926).
186. Kellog v. Schaueble, 273 Fed. 1012 (D.C.S.D. Miss. 1921).
187. Craddock v. Fulton, 140 Fed. 426 (C.C. W. Va. 1905).
188. Corbitt v. President, etc., of Farmers' Bank of Delaware, 113 Fed. 417
(C.C.E.D. Va. 1902).
189. Filer v. Levy, 17 Fed. 609 (C.C.W.D. La. 1883).
190. 141 U.S. 589, 12 S.Ct. 62, 35 L.Ed. 870 (1891).
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the evidence of which could not be discovered by the petitioner in
time to prevent the taking of the judgment.
From and to What Court Removable
Since the statutes provide for the removal of a suit pending
"in any state court," it is important to determine what is meant
by these words. There is a split of opinion as to whether a justice
of the peace holds such a "court" as to allow removal from it. 1 1 If
removal from this tribunal is refused, it can be had on an appeal to
the circuit court.19 2 The fact that a federal statute gives certain
jurisdiction to state courts precludes a case pending therein from
being a suit in a "state court" so as to be removable.193 The opposite
view was taken, however, of a suit brought in a territorial court,
though the case passed into the control of the state courts when
the territory became a state.19 4 After a case has been tried in the
state court of original jurisdiction, from which removal could have
been obtained on proper application, it sometimes happens that
the motion for removal is made in the appellate court. This is too
late. A case can be removed only from a state court of original
jurisdiction. Authority is practically unanimous on this point,195
although one state appellate court considered itself bound under
the statute to permit removal when all the requirements were
presented, while expressing an opinion that the federal court
would not take the case.' 96
The Judicial Code (§ 28) provides for removal to the federal
court "for the proper district." The next section calls for the
removal to the district court to be held in the district "where such
suit is pending,"'9 7 and there is the further provision that it be
removed to the district court "in the division in which the county
is situated from which removal is made."' 9 Now that the Wisner
rule is no longer in effect to require residence of one party in the
191. Removal from justice's court denied: New York I. & P. Co. v. Milburn
Gin & Machine Co., 35 Fed. 225 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1888), relying on the state de-
cision of Rathbone Oil Tract Co. v. Ranch, 5 W. Va. 79 (1871). Contra, allow-
ing removal: Katz v. Herschel Mfg. Co., 150 Fed. 684 (C.C.D. Neb. 1906).
192. New York I. & P. Co. v. Milburn Gin & Machine Co., 35 Fed. 225
(C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1888).
193. New Orleans Nat. Bank v. Merchant, 18 Fed. 841 (C.C.E.D. La. 1884).
194. Ames v. Colorado Cent. R. Co., 1 Fed. Cas. No. 325 (C.C.D. Colo. 1877).
195. Stevenson v. Williams, 86 U.S. 572, 22 L.Ed. 162 (1874); Lowe v. Wil-
liams, 94 U.S. 650, 24 L.Ed. 216 (1877); Craigie v. McArthur, 6 Fed. Cas. No.
3,341 (C.C.D. Minn. 1877); Berry v. Irick, 22 Grat. (Va.) 484, 12 Am. Rep. 539
(1872).
196. Sneed v. Brownlow, 44 Tenn. 209 (1867).
197. Judicial Code, § 29, 28 U.S.C.A. § 72 (1926).
198. Judicial Code, § 53, 28 U.S.C.A. § 114 (1926).
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district of removal, these sections are construed to require re-
moval to the federal court of the district wherein is located the
state court from which removal is made.19 Any other federal
court lacks jurisdiction, °2 0 but if there has been a previous change
of venue in the state courts, the district where the suit is pending
at the time of removal is controlling, regardless of where the suit
originated. 20 1 The division of removal must be the one for the
county in which the state court holding the case is located. This
rule is grounded on the policy of convenience to litigants by not
having removal to a remote di'vision.202 Thus a case was remanded
to the state court where removal was made to the wrong division,
though the objection could have been waived if not raised.20 8
AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY
The Judiciary Act of 1789 (§ 12) provided expressly for the
jurisdictional value of the suit in these words: "... and the matter
in dispute exceeds the aforesaid sum or value of five hundred
dollars, exclusive of costs, to be made to appear to the satisfaction
of the court." Similar provisions were found in other removal
acts until that of 1887-88, where the same result was reached by
the "potentiality of originality" provision, allowing removal only
when the suit could have been brought in a federal court origi-
nally, which automatically made the jurisdictional requirement
$3,000. This value must be involved not only in cases removed for
diversity of citizenship and for a federal question,20' but also in
cases of prejudice or local influence.2 5 There need be no specific
sum in issue, on the other hand, for the removal of a case arising
under federal revenue laws;206 while by an amendment of January
20, 1914, the Judicial Code was made to read as follows:
199. General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co., 260 U.S. 261, 43
S.Ct. 106, 67 L.Ed. 244 (1922); Lee v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co., 260 U.S. 653, 43
S.Ct. 230, 67 L.Ed. 443 (1923); Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Galbreath Cattle Co.,
271 U.S. 99, 46 S.Ct. 439, 70 L.Ed. 854 (1926); In re Vadner, 259 Fed. 614 (D.C.D.
Nev. 1918).
200. Stewart v. Cybur Lumber Co., 111 Miss. 844, 72 So. 276 (1916): under
Judicial Code, § 29 (28 U.S.C.A. § 72), removal must be to the federal court in
whose district the case is pending in the state court.
201. Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U.S. 73, 5 S.Ct. 377, 28 L.Ed. 927 (1885); Pavick
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 225 Fed. 395 (D.C.E.D. Miss. 1914).
202. Copcevic v. Cal. Packing Corp., 272 Fed. 994 (D.C.N.D. Cal. 1921).
203. Copcevlc v. Cal. Packing Corp., supra. Objection to wrong division
waived by defendant in removing: O'Donnell v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.,
49 Fed. 689 (C.D.S.D. Iowa 1892).
204. Ross v. Pacific S. S. Co., 272 Fed. 538 (D.C.D. Ore. 1921).
205. Ex parte Pennsylvania Co. 137 U.S. 451, 11 S.Ct. 141, 34 L.Ed. 738
(1890).
206. Before the Judicial Code of 1912, it was held that $2,000 had to be
involved for removal of a case arising under the revenue laws, Johnson v.
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Sec. 28 (last sentence). "No suit brought in any State court
of competent jurisdiction against a railroad company, or other
corporation, or person, engaged in and carrying on the busi-
ness of a common carrier, to recover damages for delay, loss
of, or injury to property received for transportation by such
common carrier under section 20 of Title 49, shall be removed
to any court of the United States where the matter in contro-
versy does not exceed, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum
or value of $3,000. ' '207
This limited the previous rule excluding from the requirement as
to sum in controversy any suits under commerce laws, 08 though
a suit under an act to regulate commerce can still be removed
regardless of the sum disputed, if it does not come within the ex-
ception quoted above.20 9
In order to satisfy the monetary requirement, therefore, the
issue of a case must have a value in money.2 10 This requirement
rules out a habeas corpus proceeding,211 an action to set aside a
divorce,2 12 and an inquisition of lunacy. 213 The amount is meas-
ured as of the time suit is commenced in the state court, excluding
interest accruing thereafter,2 14 and the sum in dispute must exceed
that named in the statute, exclusive of interest and costs. 2 5 The
phrase "exclusive of interest" is part of the section on original
jurisdiction, but it is equally applicable to removals and prevents
interest from being counted in determining the amount in contro-
versy.216 However, matured coupons of bonds can be counted in
Wells-Fargo & Co., 91 Fed. 1 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1899). In section 24 of that Code
(28 U.S.C.A. § 41), dealing with original jurisdiction, paragraph (1) states:
"The foregoing provision as to the sum or value of the matter in controversy
shall not be construed to apply to any of the cases mentioned in the succeed-
ing paragraphs of this section." Paragraph (5) deals with cases under internal
revenue, of which the federal courts thus acquire jurisdiction regardless of
amount involved, and so also removal jurisdiction under the "potentiality of
originality."
207. 28 U.S.C.A. § 71 (1926).
208. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Smith, 164 S.W. 885 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1914).
209. Allen v. New York P. & N. R. Co., 15 F. (2d) 532 (C.C.A. 4th, 1926),
certiorari denied 273 U.S. 756, 47 S.Ct. 459, 71 L.Ed. 876 (1927).
210. Washington & Georgetown Railroad Company v. District of Columbia,
146 U.S. 227, 13 S.Ct. 64, 36 L.Ed. 951 (1892).
211. Kurtz v. Moffltt, 115 U.S. 487, 6 S.Ct. 148, 29 L.Ed. 458 (1885).
212. Caswell v. Caswell, 120 Ill. 377, 11 N.E. 342 (1887).
213. U.S. v. Haviland, 297 Fed. 431 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1924).
214. Roberts v. Nelson, 11 Fed. Cas. No. 11,907 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1870); Car-
rick v. Landman, 20 Fed. 209 (C.D.N.D. Ala. 1884).
215. Kaufman v. Rheinstrom Sons Co., 188 Fed. 544 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1911).
216. Lazensky v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor, 32 Fed. 417 (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1887).
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figuring the jurisdictional amount, since they are not ordinary
interest so as to be excluded but separate instruments with an
obligation apart from the bond.2 17 As for attorney fees, their inclu-
sion seems to depend on the relevant state statute, and they can-
not be counted where the act calls for a reasonable attorney fee
being included in a recovery as part of the costs, 218 though if the
local statute does not forbid it, the parties may agree that such
fees are not costs so as to be excluded.2 . Dependence on local law
was pointed out in Conner v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co.,22 0 where,
since the state law did not expressly declare an attorney's fee to
be part of the costs taxed, it was declared a penalty and as such
was to be considered in determining the sum in issue.
Determination of Amount Involved
Somewhere in the plaintiff's pleading or in the petition of re-
moval, it should be shown that the required amount is in contro-
versy.221 When, however, the plaintiff claimed only $1,990, the
defendant could not assert that the damages to the plaintiff were
$10,000, and so secure removal by making that amount the sum in
issue.2 2 2 While the entire record is examined to see if the money
damages claimed are really involved, 2 8 still the court looks for
only the apparent sum in issue, and does not enter into an ex-
haustive collateral search as to the amount which may be affected
by the decision.2 2 4 Any disputed question of fact must be decided
by the federal court after the state court permits removal on a
prima facie showing of a proper case.225
The mere consolidation of two actions between the same
parties to take proof, when each involves less than $2,000, does
not make them one action so as to become removable; 226 and two
defendants against whom no joint liability is alleged cannot be
217. Edwards v. Bates County, 163 U.S. 269, 16 S.Ct. 967, 41 L.Ed. 155 (1896).
218. Swofford v. Cornucopia Mines of Oregon, 140 Fed. 957 (C.C.D. Ore.
1905).
219. Rogers v. Riley, 80 Fed. 759 (C.C.D. Ky. 1896).
220. 292 Fed. 767 (D.C.S.D. Fla. 1923).
221. Egan v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 53 Fed. 675 (C.C.N.D. Iowa 1893);
Reed v. Hardeman County, 77 Tex. 165, 13 S.W. 1024 (1890).
222. Iowa Cent. R. Co. v. Bacon, 236 U.S. 305, 35 S.Ct. 357, 59 L.Ed. 591
(1915).
223. Lee v. Watson, 68 U.S. 337, 17 L.Ed. 557 (1864).
224. Elgin v. Marshal, 106 U.S. 578, 1 S.Ct. 484, 27 L.Ed. 249 (1882); New
England Mortgage Security Co. v. Gay, 145 U.S. 123, 12 S.Ct. 815, 36 L.Ed.
646 (1892).
225. Follett v. Waterworks Co. of Seneca Falls, 123 Misc. 825, 206 N.Y.
Supp. 464 (1924).
226. E.A. Holmes & Co. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 142 Fed. 863 (C.C.W.D. Tenn.
1906).
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sued together to bring the amount over $2,000.227 The prima facie
amount in issue is that claimed in good faith by the plaintiff,228
and remains so until found to be not the real amount disputed,22 9
regardless of the indirect monetary effects of the judgment.23 0
An apparent exception was found in determining the federal
jurisdiction of a removed attachment suit, in which the defendant
had not been served and had not appeared generally, where the
amount in dispute was not the damages claimed in the plaintiff's
petition, but the sum named in the affidavit for attachment.2 31 So
much does plaintiff's claim carry weight, however, that even
where he has probably grossly exaggerated his damages, the court
would not venture to say that less than the jurisdictional sum was
involved, and that a remand to the state court was proper.23 2 Fur-
ther, the fact that the plaintiffs could have sued jointly for a sum
within federal jurisdiction does not prevent their suing separately,
causing their individual claims to be too low for removal . 2 3 After
a case, with sufficient amount shown in plaintiff's pleadings, has
been removed and disposed of in the federal courts otherwise than
on its merits, the plaintiff can bring a new action in the state court
with the claim reduced so as to prevent removal.23 4
It is permissible for a plaintiff, who has alleged facts which pile
up damages far in excess of the statutory jurisdictional amount,
to fix his ad damnum clause below that mark and so prevent re-
moval, his purpose in naming the sum sued for being unimpor-
tant.23 5 When, on the other hand, the plaintiff has asked for more
damages than could reasonably be supported by the substantial
averments in the body of his petition, the jurisdictional sum is
governed by the facts alleged and not by the damages demanded,
causing removal to be refused if the facts do not justify the
227. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Dishman & Tribble, 38 Tex. Civ. App. 277, 85
S.W. 319 (1905).
228. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 88 Fed. 803 (C.C.W.D. N.C.
1898), writ of error dismissed 93 Fed. 393 (C.C.A. 4th, 1899); Sturgeon River
Boom Co. v. W. H. Sawyer Lumber Co., 89 Fed. 113 (C.C.W.D. Mich 1899);
Roessler-Hasslacher Chem. Co. v. Doyle, 142 Fed. 118 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1905).
229. Kanouse v. Martin, 56 U.S. 198, 14 L.Ed. 660 (1853).
230. See citations in note 224, supra.
231. Starke v. Hoerning, 206 Fed. 1006 (D.C.E.D. Mich. 1913).
232. Smith v. Greenhow, 109 U.S. 669, 3 S.Ct. 421, 27 L.Ed. 1080 (1884).
233. Southern Ry. Co. v. Clarke, 203 Ala. 248, 82 So. 516 (1919).
234. Holbrook v. J. J. Quinlan & Co., 84 Vt. 411, 80 Atl. 339 (1911).
235. Iowa Cent. R. Co. v. Bacon, 236 U.S. 305, 35 S.Ct. 357, 59 L.Ed. 591
(1915); Barber v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 21 Ga. App. 257, 94 S.E. 280
(1917); Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Juday, 19 Ind. App. 436, 49 N.E. 843 (1898);
Springer v. Bricker, 165 Ind. 532, 76 N.E. 114 (1905); Stark v. Port Blakely
Mill Co., 44 Wash. 309, 87 Pac. 339 (1906).
19391
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
claim. 2 8 For instance, though plaintiff asked for judgment on two
unmatured notes (not containing an acceleration clause) as well
as interest and attorneys' fees, the value of the unmatured notes
was not in controversy, 27 nor was the balance of the claim for
$10,000, over and above the sole count of plaintiff's petition asking
for the license tax for 509 telegraph poles at two dollars each,
putting the maximum recovery based on facts at $1,018.238 Also,
claims in more than one paragraph, each for less than the needed
$2,000 and based on the same occurrence, cannot be added to se-
cure removal jurisdiction.2 9 Some leeway in pleading is allowed,
however, and on a suit to recover certain land and $500 damages
(when an amount over $500 was needed for removal), the court
was willing to assume the land was worth something, so as to
satisfy that requirement.2 40
Ordinarily the plaintiff's claim determines the amount in
dispute, and not a counterclaim of the defendant. 24 1 An exception
exists when the state law would bar a defendant's right to assert
his claim in another action if he failed to present it as a counter-
claim. Under such circumstances it is a necessary part of the suit
and can be counted.2 12 Application of the rule is found in one case
which refused to allow a small counterclaim to combine with
plaintiff's action for $2,950, to take the amount in controversy
over $3,000.243 In another case the court refused to add defendant's
counterclaim of $3,500 to plaintiff's demand for $1,022.61, on the
ground that the procedure was doubtful, and in such cases remand
should be made to the state court.244 On a procedural point, an
allegation in the petition of removal that the defendant expects
236. North American Transportation & Trading Co. v. Morrison, 178 U.S.
262, 20 S.Ct. 869, 44 L.Ed. 1061 (1900), where the plaintiff had ballooned his
claim for damages by asking the wages he would have earned if not injured
by defendant while on the way to hunt for a job, the court refused to con-
sider this claim, as too speculative when no job was promised.
237. Parlin & Ordendorff Implement Co. v. Frey, 200 S.W. 1143 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1918), certiorari denied 250 U.S. 640, 39 S.Ct. 491, 63 L.Ed. 1184 (1919).
238. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 62 Fed. 500 (C.C.D.
Md. 1894).
239. Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Hill, 146 Ala. 240, 40 So. 612 (1906);
Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Ryan, 31 Ind. App. 597, 68 N.E. 923 (1903).
240. Ayers v. Watson, 113 U.S. 594, 5 S.Ct. 641, 28 L.Ed. 1093 (1885). And
see Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 6 S.Ct, 501, 29 L.Ed. 729 (1886); Western
& Atlantic Railroad v. Railroad Commission of Georgia, 261 U.S. 264, 43 S.Ct.
252, 67 L.Ed. 645 (1923).
241. Bennett v. Devine, 45 Fed. 705 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1891); McKown v. Kan-
sas & T. Coal Co., 105 Fed. 657 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1901). But see Mackay v. Uinta
Development Co., 229 U.S. 173, 33 S.Ct. 638, 57 L.Ed. 1138 (1913).
242. Fearon Lumber Co. v. Lawson, 166 Ky. 123, 178 S.W. 1121 (1915).
243. Harley v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 245 Fed. 471 (D.C.W.D. Wash.
1913).
244. Crane Co. v. Guanica Centrale, 182 Fed. 713 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1904).
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to plead a counterclaim of sufficient size to take the amount in
dispute over the necessary $2,000, does not justify removal. The
court declared that the right to remove must appear in the plead-
ings at the time of removal, and the petition of removal cannot
supply any deficiencies therein. 245
One of the earlier cases on equitable relief to abate a nuisance
contained statements to the effect that the sum in controversy was
not the amount or object sought by the plaintiff, but rather the
loss caused defendant by a judgment.246 However, opinion has
since swung towards the "plaintiff viewpoint. '247
Whether the jurisdictional amount is had usually depends on
the facts of the particular case. In Marshall v. Holmes, 248 several
judgments were held in the same right, and their validity de-
pended on the same facts. The sum in controversy was held to be
their aggregate amount, thus satisfying federal jurisdiction. An-
other case of proper joinder was Brown v. Trousdale,24 where the
validity of an entire issue of tax bonds was involved and not a
single year's taxes. Joinder of all the bondholders under a single
interest was allowed in the case and the federal jurisdictional
sum was obtained, though lack of complete diversity of citi-
zenship caused a remand. In Berryman v. Board of Trustees of
Whitman College,250 a college tried to enforce. a contract with the
state exempting its property from taxation, and the amount in
dispute was declared to be the value of that exemption, worth
over $2,000, and not the single element of the tax for one year, an
amount less than that sum. When several plaintiffs sought to
enforce a vendor's lien, which was a single and undivided right
that neither could enforce alone, the amount in controversy was
their collective interest.2 5 1 On the other hand, when a plaintiff
was found to be only the assignee for collection and not the owner
of claims aggregating over the jurisdictional amount, but no one
245. Sturgeon River Boom Co. v. W. H. Sawyer Co., 89 Fed. 113 (C.C.W.D.
Mich. 1898).
246. Mississippi & Missouri R. Co. v. Ward, 67 U.S. 485, 17 L.Ed. 311 (1863).
247. Washington Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, 25 L.Ed. 782 (1879);
Hunt v. New York Cotton Exchange, 205 U.S. 322, 27 S.Ct. 529, 51 L.Ed. 821
(1907); Duff v. Hildreth, 183 Mass. 440, 67 N.E. 356 (1903). For a discussion of
the "plaintiff viewpoint," see Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount In the United
States District Court (1925) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 733, (1925) 59 Am. L. Rev. 707,
(1926) 11 Va. L. Reg. (N.S.) 513.
248. 141 U.S. 589, 12 S.Ct. 62, 35 L.Ed. 870 (1891).
249. 138 U.S. 389, 11 S.Ct. 308, 34 L.Ed. 987 (1891).
250. 222 U.S. 334, 32 S.Ct. 147, 56 L.Ed. 225 (1912).
251. Troy Bank v. G. A. Whitehead and Co., 222 U.S. 39, 32 S.Ct. 9, 56 L.Ed.
81 (1911).
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claim alone exceeding it, jurisdiction was denied.252 Similarly,
where a state sued as a mere nominal party, removal could not
be had when no one of the claims sued on was for a sufficiently
large amount to satisfy federal jurisdiction. 258 A common situa-
tion is illustrated in Rogers v. Hennepin County,254 where it was
declared that when a tax was on each of the plaintiffs separately,
they could not join their suits restraining the tax, in order to
bring the sum in dispute within the jurisdictional amount.
Effect of Plaintiff's Amendment Changing the Amount Claimed
If, before removal has been effected, the plaintiff reduces the
amount of his claim below the jurisdictional limit, or even makes
a motion to do so, the amendment is effective to prevent the re-
moval from being made later.22 5 Plaintiff's intent to defeat re-
moval by the reduction is not important. 25 1 For instance, after the
defendant had served notice on the plaintiff that he intended ask-
ing for removal, the state court could still allow an amendment of
the claim downward to defeat removal, since the plaintiff retained
the right to control his case until something occurred to take it
out of the state court's power to permit amendment, namely, the
removal itself.2 57 An amendment filed in vacation without notice
to the defendant makes the case nonremovable if not forbidden
by state law,2 5  but not if the state law requires notice, which is
not given.259
If the defendant has filed his petition of removal before the
motion to amend is made, one view maintains that the amend-
ment may still be granted;260 the other, that it is too late.26, The
252. Woodside v. Beckham, 216 U.S. 117, 30 S.Ct. 367, 54 L.Ed. 408 (1910).
253. Title Guaranty and Surety Co. v. Idaho, 240 U.S. 136 S.Ct. 345, 60 L.Ed.
566 (1916).
254. 239 U.S. 621, 36 S.Ct. 217, 60 L.Ed. 469 (1916).
255. Blair v. Chicago, 201 U.S. 400, 26 S.Ct. 427, 50 L.Ed. 801 (1906); Wheeler
v. Denver, 229 U.S. 342, 33 S.Ct. 842, 57 L.Ed. 1219 (1913); Maine v. Gilman, 11
Fed. 214 (C.C.D. Me. 1882); Lake Erie and W. R. Co. v. Huffman, 177 Ind. 126,
97 N.E. 434, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1272 (1912).
256. Munnss v. American Agricultural Chemical Co., 216 Mass. 423, 103
N.E. 859 (1914).
257. Anderson v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 218 Fed. 78 (D.C.E.D. Ark.
1914).
258. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Campbell, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 204, 91 S.W.
312 (1905).
259. Peterson v. Chicago, M. and St. P. Ry. Co., 108 Fed. 561 (C.C.W.D. Mo.
1901).
260. Spiers v. Halsted, 74 N.C. 620 (1876); People v. Judges of N. Y. Com-
mon Pleas, 2 Denio 197 (N.Y. 1846).
261. Kanouse v. Martin, 56 U.S. 198, 14 L.Ed. 660 (1853); Cumberland Gap
Building and Loan Ass'n v. Wells, 99 Ga. 228, 25 S.E. 246 (1896); Chicago, R. I.
and P. Ry. Co. v. Stone and Bronnenberg, 70 Kan. 708, 79 Pac. 655 (1905); Ray
v. So. Ry. Co., 77 S.C. 103, 57 S.E. 636 (1907).
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latter is more in accord with the theory of an instantaneous pass-
ing of the case out of the state court's hands when the petition and
bond of removal are properly filed. 62 The question whether the
amendment downward of the ad damnum of plaintiff's writ or the
defendant's petition of removal was filed first, must be determined
by the state court from the face of the record, 26 and if there are
disputed issues of fact as to which came first, these issues must be
tried by the federal court before it considers the motion to re-
mand. 26
4
If a claim not originally removable is raised in amount by
amendment of the plaintiff so as to become removable, the de-
fendant can then remove by proper application. 265 The case be-
comes removable as soon as the plaintiff raises the ante of his
claim over the jurisdictional limit.266
After a removal has been effected, an amendment in the fed-
eral court, taking the sum in issue below the mark set for federal
jurisdiction, does not divest the control already obtained, if con-
trol is based on a sufficient showing in the state court of the juris-
dictional amount on the record.2 61
CITIZENSHIP
Provision for federal jurisdiction based on citizenship is to the
effect that any suit in law and equity which involves over $3,000
and "(b) is between citizens of different states, or (c) is between
citizens of a State and foreign States, citizens, or subjects," may
be brought originally in the federal district court.2 66 Either state
citizenship or citizenship in a foreign country must be specifically
alleged to obtain removal.2 69 Because of the requirement of citi-
zenship in a particular state, a citizen of the United States having
262. Kanouse v. Martin, 56 U.S. 198, 14 L.Ed. 660 (1853). For the point that
federal jurisdiction, once attached,, is not lost by later changes in the situation
of the parties, see Morgan v. Morgan, 15 U.S. 290, 4 L.Ed. 242 (1817); Clarke
v. Mathewson, 37 U.S. 164, 9 L.Ed. 1041 (1838).
263. Munnss v. American Agricultural Chemical Co., 216 Mass. 423, 103
N.E. 859 (1914).
264. Waite v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 62 Fed. 769 (C.C.M.D. Tenn. 1894).
265. Ft. Smith and W. R. Co. v. Blevins, 35 Okla. 378, 130 Pac. 525 (1913).
266. McCulloch v. Southern Ry. Co., 149 N.C. 305, 62 S.E. 1096 (1908).
267. Hayward v. Nordberg Mfg. Co., 85 Fed. 4 (C.C.A. 6th, 1898); Twin
Hills Gasoline Co. v. Bradford Oil Corp., 264 Fed. 440 (D.C.E.D. Okla. 1919).
268. Judicial Code, § 24, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (Supp. 1938). Though dealing
with original jurisdiction, this limitation to suits between citizens of different
states, and between a citizen of a state and a foreign country or alien, Is
equally applicable to removals, because of the "potentiality of originality" re-
quirement.
269. Grace v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 109 U.S. 278, 3 S.Ct. 207, 27 L.Ed.
932 (1883).
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no state citizenship could not remove a suit brought by a citizen of
the state, 27 0 and neither can citizens of the District of Columbia
or of some territory.2 1 An unnaturalized member of an Indian
tribe is not a citizen of a foreign country or of a state for removal
purposes, 2 2 and consequently removal can be had only if plain-
tiff's petition shows that a federal question is involved. 27 1
A state is a sovereignty, and not a "citizen" in the removal
sense, and it follows that removal cannot be had of a suit between
a state as a substantial party and a citizen of another state on the
ground of diversity of citizenship; a federal question is needed to
remove an action between such parties.274 Sometimes it is doubt-
ful whether the state is joined as a real or merely nominal
party,2 5 and if it is clear that the state has no real interest in the
suit, and diverse citizenship is had between the real party in in-
terest and the opposing party, removal is allowed. 276  A direct
action by the state to recover unpaid taxes from a nonresident is
clearly nonremovable because the state is here a real party,2 77 but
it is more doubtful when someone else sues on behalf of the state
for a legal penalty. 27 8 Incapacity for state citizenship does not
extend to the subdivisions of the state, such as a municipal corpo-
ration, which is a citizen of the state; and when it sues a citizen
of another state to settle title to tidewater land in which it has a
270. Hough v. Soci~t6 Electrique Westinghouse de Russe, 231 Fed. 341
(D.C.S.D. N.Y. 1916).
271. Barney v. Baltimore, 73 U.S. 280, 18 L.Ed. 825 (1868); Cameron v.
Hodges, 127 U.S. 322, 8 S.Ct. 1154, 32 L.Ed. 132 (1888); Healy v. McCormick, 157
Fed. 318 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1907); Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Butte-Balaklava
Copper Co., 200 Fed. 808 (D.C.D. Mont. 1912).
272. Paul v. Chilsoquie, 70 Fed. 401 (C.C.D. Ind. 1895).
273. Tennessee v. Union and Planters Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 14 S.Ct. 654, 38
L.Ed. 511 (1894).
274. Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U.S. 430, 6 S.Ct. 799, 29 L.Ed. 962 (1886);
Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 15 S.Ct. 192, 39 L.Ed. 231
(1894); Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467, 10 S.Ct. 651, 34 L.Ed 196 (1890).
275. Title Guarantee and Surety Co. of Sacranto v. Idaho, 240 U.S. 136, 36
S.Ct. 345, 60 L.Ed. 566 (1916).
276. Missouri, Kansas and Texas R. Co. v. Hickman, 183 U.S. 53, 22 S.Ct.
18, 46 L.Ed. 78 (1901); Ex parte Nebraska, 209 U.S. 436, 28 S.Ct. 581, 52 L.Ed.
876 (1908).
277. Darnell v. State, 174 Ind. 143, 90 N.E. 769 (1910), affirmed 226 U.S. 390,
33 S.Ct. 120, 57 L.Ed. 267 (1912); Nevada-California Power Co. v. Hamilton, 235
Fed. 317 (D.C.D. Nev. 1916); Commonwealth v. Norman, 249 Mass. 123, 144
N.E. 66 (1924).
278. The state was declared a real party so as to prevent removal: in a
suit by the revenue agent to recover land on the claim of title in the state,
Robertson v. Jordan River Lumber Co., 269 Fed. 606 (C.C.A. 5th, 1921); and
in an action to recover a penalty for violation of a statute, though half would
go to the prosecuting attorney, Southern R. Co. v. State, 165 Ind. 613, 75 N.E.
272 (1905). On the other hand, the fact of being beneficiary to recovery did
not make a school district a party to the record so as to block removal: Parks
v. Carriere Consol. School Dist., 12 F. (2d) 37 (C.C.A. 5th, 1926).
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direct monetary interest as a real party along with the state,
removal can be had.27 9 Suit by a citizen of another state against a
county may also be removed. 80
Partnerships, Joint Stock Companies, and Corporations
A partnership has no state citizenship as an entity, and re-
moval may be had only when complete diversity of citizenship
exists between each individual member of the partnership and the
opposing party.2 81 Citizenship of the partnership cannot be the
basis for removal, even when the law of the place where the action
arose recognizes it as an entity capable of suing and being sued.282
Thus, it was held that the act of alleging the state citizenship of
each partner in the removal petition did not effect removability,
when the action was against the group in the firm name, and not
against the individuals.28  The same is true of the joint stock
company; federal jurisdiction is controlled by the citizenship of
its individual members,284 even though the entity is authorized
by law of the state in which it is organized to sue in the name of
its president. 285
Although the situation is now different as to a corporation,
the first decision on corporate citizenship was that a corporation
could sue and be sued in a federal court only when each of its
members was a citizen of a different state from the other party-
the logical result of small companies doing a predominantly intra-
state business, and having stockholders who might be expected to
reside within the state of their creation.2 86 As corporations crossed
state lines more often, the rule became so inconvenient as to be
abandoned, and the conclusive presumption was indulged that all
279. Seattle v. Oregon and W. R. Co., 255 U.S. 56, 41 S.Ct. 237, 65 L.Ed.
500 (1921).
280. Board of Commissioners of Floyd County v. Hurd, 49 Ga. 462, 15 Am.
Rep. 682 (1873).
281. Grace v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 109 U.S. 278, 3 S.Ct. 207, 27 L.Ed. 932
(1883); Adams v. May, 27 Fed. 907 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1886); H. L. Bruett and
Co. v. F. C. Austin Drainage Excavator Co., 174 Fed. 668 (C.C.N.D. Iowa 1909).
282. People of Porto Rico v. Fortuna Estates, 279 Fed. 500 (C.C.A. 1st,
1922), cert. denied 259 U.S. 587, 42 S.Ct. 590, 66 L.Ed. 1077 (1922).
283. Ralya Market Co. v. Armour and Co., 102 Fed. 530 (C.C.N.D. Iowa
1900).
284. Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 9 S.Ct. 426, 32 L.Ed. 800 (1889);
Texas and Pacific Co. v. Knox, 214 U.S. 153, 29 S.Ct. 564, 53 L.Ed. 946 (1909).
285. Taylor v. Weir, 171 Fed. 636 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1909). Cf. Boatner v. Ameri-
can Exp. Co., 122 Fed. 714 (C.C.W.D. Ky. 1903), where state law also allowed
the officer to represent the large group in a suit, and he was able to secure re-
moval based on diverse citizenship existing between himself and the plain-
tiff.
286. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 3 L.Ed. 38 (1809).
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incorporators are citizens of the state under whose laws it is
formed, which amounts to calling it a citizen of that state for
removal purposes.2 17 The rule of practical citizenship in the state
of incorporation, giving the corporation a right to remove a suit
instituted in another state by a citizen of that state, has since
been consistently followed in both federal courts288 and state
courts.
2 9
After becoming a citizen of one state by creation under its
laws, the corporation may extend operations by doing business in
another state in one of two ways: first, by incorporation there
also, which-if real and not simply colorable reincorporation-
domesticates the corporation and prevents it from removing a
suit by a citizen of the state;29 0 and second, by obtaining a li-
cense to do business in the second state, which still leaves it a
citizen only of the state of incorporation, and thus able to remove
an action by a citizen of the second state.2 1 The first method is
recognized when the reincorporation is real, as in the above-cited
Memphis R. Co. v. Alabama, where the company was forced by
state statute to open its books for the sale of stock in the state and
to hold a meeting of stockholders there. When merely a device
for preventing removal, a line of cases declares the act void, and
the attempt unavailing.28 2
A distinction has been drawn between the requirement of an
actual "incorporation" in the second state, and an attempt to
"domesticate" the foreign corporation, the first preventing re-
moval, and the second failing to do so, though perhaps making
the corporation a citizen of the state for purposes other than re-
moval.218 On the other hand, the corporation may originally incor-
287. Louisville, Cincinnati, and Charleston R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497,
11 L.Ed. 853 (1844).
288. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 19 L.Ed. 357 (1869); Railway Company
v. Whitton's Adm'r, 80 U.S. 270, 20 L.Ed. 571 (1872); Southern R. Co. v. Allison,
190 U.S. 326, 23 S.Ct. 713, 47 L.Ed. 1078 (1903); Thomas v. South Butte Mining
Co., 230 Fed. 968 (C.C.A. 9th, 1916).
289. Rosenfleld v. Adams Express Co., 21 La. Ann. 233 (1869); Gist v. John-
son Carey Co., 161 Wis. 79, 151 N.W. 382 (1915).
290. Memphis and Charleston R. Co. v. Alabama, 107 U.S. 581, 2 S.Ct. 482,
27 L.Ed. 518 (1882); Graham v. Boston, Hartford and Erie R. Co., 118 U.S. 161,
6 S.Ct. 1009, 30 L.Ed. 196 (1886).
291. Railroad Co. v. Koontz, 104 U.S. 5, 26 L.Ed. 643 (1881); Marye v. Bal-
timore and Ohio R. Co., 127 U.S. 117, 8 S.Ct. 1037, 32 L.Ed. 94 (1888); Gerling
v. Baltimore and Ohio R. Co., 151 U.S. 673, 14 S.Ct. 533, 38 L.Ed. 311 (1894);
Knorr v. Home Ins. Co. of N.Y., 25 Wis. 143, 3 Am. Rep. 26 (1869).
292. Southern R. Co. v. Allison, 190 U.S. 326, 23 S.Ct. 713, 47 L.Ed. 1078
(1903), and cases cited therein. See discussion on statutory interference (by
states) with removal by foreign corporations, supra p. 507.
293. Foy and Shemwell v. Georgia-Alabama Power Co., 298 Fed. 643 (D.C.
S.D. Ga. 1924).
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porate in a number of states, preventing a removal from the state
court of any one of them;2 9' while a corporation, formed by the
consolidation of two or more corporations created in different
states, is domestic to each of those states, and unable to remove
a suit in the courts of any one.2 5 A state court has held that
when a corporation has agreed to a private act permitting it to
consolidate with foreign corporations on condition that the state
court should not lose jurisdiction over the corporation, it could
not remove a case for diversity of citizenship.2 9 6
Representative Parties
Jurisdiction is generally governed by the citizenship of the
parties on the record.2 9 7 Thus, when a representative party holds
title to the property or cause of action and is the party of record
in a suit, his personal citizenship in most cases governs remova-
bility, regardless of the citizenship of the one he represents or of
the deceased whose estate he administers.2 8 The citizenship of the
trustee who possesses as owner becomes a governing factor of
jurisdiction,2 99 and it continues to be such until the purpose of his
trusteeship is satisfied.300 Where, however, the trustee holds the
property as a mere agent for the beneficial use of another, his
citizenship no longer controls and that of the beneficiary is the
deciding factor of jurisdiction. 01 A trustee in a bankruptcy action
in the state court to recover property fraudulently transferred
was allowed to remove, upon the ground of diverse citizenship
between defendant and trustee2 0 2
Citizenship of an administrator is likewise a controlling factor
of jurisdiction, and must be specifically alleged to present a re-
movable case.303 In determining what is the administrator's citi-
294. Patch v. Wabash R. Co., 207 U.S. 277, 28 S.Ct. 80, 52 L.Ed. 204 (1907).
295. Johnson v. Philadelphia, W. and B. R. Co., 9 Fed. 6 (C.C.E.D. Penn.
1181); Case v. Atlanta, C. A. L. Ry. Co., 225 Fed. 862 (D.C.W.D. S. C. 1915).
296. Mizell v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 181 N.C. 36, 106 S.E. 133 (1921).
297. Bonnafee v. Williams, 44 U.S. 574, 11 L.Ed. 732 (1845).
298. Rolfe v. Rundle, 103 U.S. 222, 26 L.Ed. 337 (1881); Southern Ry. Co.
v. Barrett, Denton and Lynn Co., 141 Ga. 584, 81 S.E. 863 (1914).
299. Thayer v. Life Association of America, 112 U.S. 717, 5 S.Ct. 355, 28
L.Ed. 864 (1885); Vimont v. Chicago and N. W. Ry. Co., 64 Iowa 513, 21 N.W.
9 (1884); Mead v. Walker, 15 Wis. 553 (1862).
300. Knapp v. Troy and Boston R. R. Co., 87 U.S. 117, 22 L.Ed. 328 (1874).
301. Bogue v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 193 Fed. 728 (D.C.S.D. Iowa 1912).
302. Ewing v. S.L. Leszynsky and Co., 236 Fed. 811 (D.C.W.D. Wash. 1916).
303. Bondurant v. Watson, 103 U.S. 278, 26 L.Ed. 447 (1881); Railroad Co.
v. Koontz, 104 U.S. 5, 26 L.Ed. 643 (1881); Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U.S. 73, 5 S.Ct.
377, 26 L.Ed. 927 (1885); Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Rhoads, 119 U.S. 237, 7
S.Ct. 193, 30 L.Ed. 380 (1886); Roach's Adm'r v. Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co. of Cin-
cinnati, 201 Ky. 713, 258 S.W. 300 (1924).
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zenship, a single state decision has held that one who qualified
as administrator in another state was a citizen of that state for
the purpose of the suit." 4 However, the contrary of this proposi-
tion is undoubtedly the general rule°0-- the administrator's per-
sonal citizenship is controlling. A receiver's personal citizenship
governs jurisdiction in like manner, so as to permit removal for
diverse citizenship. 0 6
A different situation exists as to a guardian or next friend of
an infant. The citizenship of the infant governs jurisdiction.80
Similarly, the citizenship of a married woman as plaintiff controls
jurisdiction, and not that of a guardian. 0 8 Another situation
where the representative's personal citizenship had no effect on
jurisdiction was a suit against the Director General of Railroads,
growing out of claims arising while the United States operated all
railroads during the World War. Removability was governed by
the citizenship of the railroad corporation on whose road the acci-
dent or claim arose.8 0 9
Assignments, and Colorable Transfers
The section on original jurisdiction of federal courts, section
24 of the Judicial Code, contains the limitation that,
"No District Court shall have cognizance of any suit (ex-
cept upon foreign bills of exchange) to recover upon any
promissory note or other chose in action in favor of any as-
signee, or of any subsequent holder if such instrument be
payable to bearer and be not made by any corporation, unless
such suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover
upon said note or other chose in action if no assignment had
been made." 10
304. Lemon's Adm'r v. Louisville and N. R. Co., 137 Ky. 276, 125 S.W. 701
(1910).
305. Amory v. Amory, 95 U.S. 186, 24 L.Ed. 428 (1877); Miler v. Sunde, 1
N.D. 1, 44 N.W. 301 (1890).
306. Davies v. Lathrop, 12 Fed. 353 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1882); Brisenden v.
Chamberlain, 53 Fed. 307 (C.C.D. S. C. 1892); Pepper v. Rogers, 128 Fed. 987
(C.C.D. Mass. 1904).
307. Matter of Moore, 209 U.S. 490, 28 S.Ct. 585, 52 L.Ed. 904, 14 Ann. Cas.
1164 (1908); Woolridge v. McKenna, 8 Fed. 650 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1881); Voss
v. Neineber, 68 Fed. 947 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1895).
308. Wormley v. Wormley, 21 U.S. 421, 5 L.Ed. 651 (1823); Ruckman v.
Palisade Land Co., 1 Fed. 367 (C.C.D. N.J. 1880).
309. Porsmer v. Davis, 152 Minn. 181, 188 N.W. 279 (1922). Accord, Payne
v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 27 Ga. App. 283, 108 S.E. 71 (1921); Davis v. Haw-
kins, 28 Ga. App. 203, 110 S.E. 500 (1922); Mizell v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,
181 N.C. 36, 106 S.E. 133 (1921).
310. 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (1926).
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Before the Act of 1887-88, however, this "assignment provision,"
found in the section on original jurisdiction and not referred to in
the removal section, did not apply to removals, and suit by the
assignee of a note obtained from a person unable to sue originally
in a federal court, could be removed by the defendant under the
Acts of 1789,11 and of 1875.812
A vital change occurred when provision was inserted in
the removal section that jurisdiction on removal should be had
only when it would be had on original suit in the federal court:
"potentiality of originality." This now prevents removal-as well
as original federal suit-of an action by an assignee of a promis-
sory note or other like chose in action, when the assignor could
not have sued in the federal court, under the restrictive policy of
the 1887-88 Act.813 When the instrument is a chose in action
within the meaning of this provision, the citizenship of the as-
signor governs jurisdiction so as to rule out removal if the as-
signor could not have sued before assigning; 14 but it has been held
that the defendant may waive the objection that the suit was not
brought in the assignor's district of residence, by removing such a
suit to the federal court of the district in which is located the state
court originally seised of the case.3 15
The "assignment provision" takes care of transfers made to
confer federal jurisdiction based on citizenship, but what of
colorable transfers made to prevent removal from the state court,
by passing the claim to a citizen of the same state as the defend-
ant? Here the transferee's petition shows a suit between citizens
of the same state, and removal cannot be made on the claim of a
colorable transfer. This claim must be set up as a defense in the
state court, which may grant relief by setting aside the transfer
and allowing removal based on the citizenship of the original
parties.3 1 As to what makes the transfer "colorable," it has been
held that when partners actually conveyed all the firm's property
311. Bushnell v. Kennedy, 76 U.S. 387, 19 L.Ed. 736 (1870).
312. Claflin v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. of Boston, Mass., 110 U.S. 81, 3 S.Ct.
507, 28 L.Ed. 76 (1884).
318. Mexican Nat. R. Co. v. Davidson, 157 U.S. 201, 15 S.Ct. 563, 39 L.Ed.
672 (1895).
314. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y. v. McCabe, 250 Fed. 699 (C.C.A. 2nd,
1918), cert. denied 247 U.S. 505, 38 S.Ct. 427, 62 L.Ed. 1240 (1918); State Bank
of Swea City, Iowa v. Chicago and N. W. Ry. Co., 281 Fed. 345 (D.C.N.D. Iowa
1922).
315. Cincinnati, H. and D. Ry. Co. v. Orr, 215 Fed. 261 (D.C.E.D. N.Y.
1914).
316. Provident Say. Life Assurance Society of N. Y. v. Ford, 114 U.S. 635,
5 S.Ct. 1104, 29 L.Ed. 261 (1885); Leather Manufacturers' Nat. Bank v. Cooper,
120 U.S. 778, 7 S.Ct. 777, 30 L.Ed. 816 (1887).
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to a newly-created corporation, receiving its stock in return with-
out contemplation of a reconveyance, such action was not a sham
or simulated transfer, even though made for the purpose of in-
voking federal jurisdiction for the corporation. 17 Neither was the
transfer merely colorable and fictitious where the assignee paid a
consideration of $3,000 for a claim of $8,972 against the defendant
telegraph company, though a transfer without consideration might
be subject to that objection. 18 In order to avoid being regarded as
simulated, a transfer must be made before the action begins.8 19
The federal district court has jurisdiction of a suit in which
the United States or an officer thereof is a real party in interest;""
but it has been held that the joinder of the United States as a
merely nominal party does not make a suit removable when the
real controversy is between the state treasurer and sureties on the
bond of a receiver appointed by a federal court.21 Here the con-
struction of the bond did not involve a "federal question" and
removal could not have been permitted on that ground.
[To be concluded]
317. Slaughter v. Mallett Land and Cattle Co., 141 Fed. 282 (C.C.A. 5th,
1905), cert. denied 201 U.S. 646, 26 S.Ct. 761, 50 L.Ed. 903 (1906).
318. Wells v. Western Union Tel. Co., 144 Iowa 605, 123 N.W. 371, 24 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 1045, 138 Am. St. Rep. 317 (1909).
319. City of N.Y. v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 36 S.Ct. 25, 60 L.Ed. 143 (1915).
320. Judicial Code, § 24, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41.
321. U. S. v. Douglas, 113 N.C. 190, 18 S.E. 202 (1893).
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